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This dissertation consists of two essays that analyze economic issues that fall within the 
sub-field of economics known as Industrial Organization. The essays focus on commercial aviation 
and coffee industries, respectively. The two essays maintain tight connections between economic 
theory and empirical analysis, and examine the observed economic phenomena in their respective 
markets in the past few years using econometric methods that are popular in Industrial 
Organization. 
The first essay investigates the U.S. domestic airlines’ pricing strategies in response to the 
significant worldwide decline in crude oil price beginning in mid-2014 through to 2015. 
Specifically, this essay examines the market mechanisms through which crude oil price may 
influence airfare, which facilitates identifying the possible market and airline-specific 
characteristics that may influence the extent to which crude oil price changes affect airfare. The 
essay first uses a simple theoretical model of air travel demand and Nash equilibrium price-setting 
behavior of airlines to derive clear theoretical predictions that guide proper specification of 
reduced-form regression models and help with interpreting empirical results. The empirical results 
reveal that there is a positive pass-through from changes in crude oil price to airfare, but the 
magnitude of the pass-through depends on several origin-destination market and airline-specific 
characteristics. In particular, the magnitude of the pass-through tends to be greater in more 
competitive origin-destination markets, smaller in longer distance markets, and smaller among 
airlines that purchase fuel using hedging contracts. 
The second essay analyzes the market effects of the introduction of single-cup coffee brew 
technology on the U.S. brew-at-home coffee market, particularly on the traditional auto-drip brew 
coffee segment. The introduction of single-cup coffee brew technology in the late 2000s has not 
  
only changed the way many brew-at-home coffee drinkers brew and consume coffee in daily life, 
i.e. a change from brewing one “pot” at a time to making one cup at a time, but also altered the 
overall landscape of the brew-at-home coffee market in the U.S. This paper analyses the economic 
impacts in the U.S. brew-at-home coffee market associated with the introduction and growing 
presence of single-cup coffee brew technology. We find that a typical coffee drinker is willing to 
pay up to 2.52 cents extra per fluid ounce to consume freshly brewed coffee from single-cup 
brewing machines instead of using the traditional auto-drip brewing method, and this marginal 
willingness to pay gap increases with consumers’ income level. Second, we find that both the 
demand and profitability of traditional auto-drip brew coffee products are substantially lower 
owing to the growing consumer valuation of single-cup brew technology. Last, our analysis reveals 
that consumers enjoy substantially higher welfare owing to the introduction and growing 
popularity of single-cup brew coffee products.  
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Chapter 1 - Cost Pass-Through in Commercial Aviation 
 1.1 Introduction 
Brent Crude, the energy price index that many airline executives monitor, serves as an 
important instrument for these executives to predict future fuel costs for their airline because: (i) 
the index captures price movements of a key component of jet fuel; and (ii) the index is normally 
highly correlated with prices of its refinery products.1 Crude oil price declined from $111.8/barrel 
in June 2014 to $38.01/barrel in December 2015, an approximate 66% reduction.2 Consistent with 
the decline in crude oil price, financial information reported by the four major U.S. airlines, 
American, Delta, United, and Southwest, in their 10-K filings documented to U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) shows that all four major airlines experienced a significant decline 
in their fuel expenses from 2014 to 2015 (see Table 1.1). For example, American and Delta 
Airlines reported more than 40% saving in fuel costs, while United and Southwest had over 30% 
reduction of fuel expenses during this period.3 In spite of fuel cost savings, industry analysts have 
                                                 
1 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement 133 requires a hedge must be shown to be highly 
effective to corporations. A hedge is deemed effective if the ratio of the change in value of the derivative (e.g. crude 
oil) to that of the hedged item (e.g. jet fuel) falls between 80% and 125%, i.e. “80/125 rule.” Southwest (and many 
other air carriers) relies on crude oil and/or its refinery products to hedge against the risk of fuel costs fluctuations due 
to jet fuel price changes.    
2 Oil price is represented by Brent crude oil spot price from Energy Information Administration (EIA): 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=rbrte&f=m.  
3 There are extensive studies that investigate the relationship between crude oil price and prices of its refinery 
petroleum products. For example, Asche et al (2003) applied multivariate analysis in oil industry in northern Europe 
and found evidence that prices of crude oil, gasoline and kerosene fuel are proportional with constant spreads. They 
further pointed out that refinery petroleum industry is an example of “supply driven market integration.” Li (2010) 
also provided strong evidence that jet fuel price adjusts towards the long-run co-integration with crude oil price.  
2 
pointed out that airfares have been “essentially stable during this period.”4 Airline price data 
released by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) showed that the monthly average airfare 
decreased by less than 5%,5 which is quite trivial compared with the size of reduction in crude oil 
price as well as jet fuel price over this time period. 
 
Table 1.1 Fuel Expense (% of Operating Expenses) for 4 Major U.S. Airlines 
Year American Delta United Southwest 
2013 35.4% 33.3% 34% 35.1% 
2014 33.2% 35.4% 32% 32.3% 
2015 21.6% 23% 23% 23% 
 
 
2014-2015 Fuel Expense % Change 
- 41.2% - 43.9% - 36% - 31.7% 
Source: Airlines’ SEC 10-K filings. 
 
To obtain a better picture of how market airfare responded to crude oil and jet fuel prices 
during this time period, we plot the quarterly percentage change of crude oil price, jet fuel price 
and industry average airfare from the third quarter of 2013 to the fourth quarter of 2015 in Figure 
1.1. In this price series plot, a notably positive relationship is evident between crude oil price and 
jet fuel price over the sample period. Notice that crude oil and jet fuel prices start to decline 
dramatically in mid-2014, whereas industry average airfare shows little or no co-movement with 
the energy prices during this period. This simple plot suggests that airline fuel cost savings have 
little or no pass-through to airfare. However, one may argue that an industry average airfare may 
not be reflective of how air carriers adjust airfare in response to their fuel cost changes. It is 
                                                 
4 The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/business/energy-environment/airlines-reap-record-
profits-and-passengers-get-peanuts.html?_r=0.  
5 BLS database URL source: http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CUsR0000SETG01?output_view=pct_3mths.  
3 
possible that airfare tracks crude oil and jet fuel prices better in some air travel markets than others. 
To this end, we select two distinct markets:6 OAK (Oakland, CA) to GEG (Spokane, WA) and 
SYR (Syracuse, NY) to PHX (Phoenix, AZ) and plot in the upper panel of Figure 1.2 the quarterly 
percentage change of crude oil price, jet fuel price, and average airfare in the two markets. Both 
markets are similar with respect to the number of airlines that compete in the market; specifically, 
each of the two markets has three competing airlines. However, the two markets differ 
substantially with respect to travel distance; in particular, OAK-GEG has a non-stop flight distance 
of 723 miles, while SYR-PHX has a non-stop flight distance of 2045 miles. In the upper panel of 
Figure 1.2, it is noticeable that changes in average fare in the OAK-GEG market intimately follow 
changes in energy prices. However, in the SYR-PHX market, changes in average fare often move 
in the opposite direction to changes in energy prices, and the opposite movement becomes more 
prominent from the third quarter of 2014 onwards. In summary, controlling for the number of 
competing carriers, the price change plots in the upper panel of Figure 1.2 suggest that fuel cost 
pass-through to airfare tends to be larger in the shorter distance market (OAK-GEG) compared to 
the longer distance market (SYR-PHX). 
The lower panel of Figure 1.2 plots quarterly percentage changes in crude oil price, jet fuel 
price, and average airfare in two markets: OAK (Oakland, CA) to GEG (Spokane, WA) and BWI 
(Baltimore, MD) to MLB (Melbourne, FL).  The BWI-MLB has a non-stop flight distance of 797 
miles, which is comparable to the nonstop flight distance in the OAK-GEG market of 723 miles. 
However, BWI-MLB is a monopoly market served only by Delta Airlines with a one-stop 
connection flight, whereas OAK-GEG is a market served by three airlines offering multiple 
                                                 
6 The two markets are chosen to illustrate how airfare may respond differently to energy prices across markets with 
distinct characteristics. 
4 
competing products.7 As such, it is reasonable to conjecture that the OAK-GEG market is more 
competitive than the BWI-MLB market.  In the lower panel of Figure 1.2, while changes in average 
fare in the OAK-GEG market intimately follow the energy price changes, there is little or no co-
movement of changes in airfare and changes in energy prices for the BWI-MLB market. In 
summary, controlling for market travel distance, the price change plots in the lower panel of Figure 
1.2 suggest that fuel cost pass-through to airfare tends to be larger in the more competitive market 
(OAK-GEG) compared to the monopoly market (BWI-MLB). 
 
Figure 1.1 Energy Prices and Average Airfare across all U.S. Domestic Air Travel Markets 
Source: DB1B database and Energy Information Administration (EIA)  
                                                 
7 In the OAK-GEG market, Delta and Alaska Airlines consistently provided one-stop connection flights, while 
Southwest Airlines consistently offered non-stop flights across the whole sample period. In the fourth quarter of 2013 
and second quarter of 2014, Southwest exceptionally served two-stop connection flights together with a non-stop 
service. 
5 
Figure 1.2 Energy Prices and Airfare in select U.S. Domestic Air Travel Markets 
 
 
Source: DB1B database and Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
 
The above observations raise two interesting questions that this paper seeks to answer: (i) 
what are the market mechanisms through which crude oil price influences airfare? and (ii) what 
are the possible factors that may influence the extent to which crude oil price changes affect 
airfare?  To achieve this goal, we first specify a simple theoretical model of air travel demand and 
6 
supply in an origin-destination market. We rely on this simple theoretical model to study market 
channels through which changes in crude oil price may be reflected in airfare. The simple 
theoretical model yields clear predictions of the relationship between crude oil price and airfare, 
as well as reveals factors that may influence the strength of the relationship. With the theoretical 
model as a guiding framework, we subsequently compile a data set of information drawn from 
U.S. domestic air travel markets, then use reduced-form regression analysis to empirically test 
predictions from the theoretical model.  
Key results from the analysis are as follows. First, our theoretical model predicts that there 
is a positive pass-through (also referred as “price transmission8”) from crude oil price changes to 
airfare and the magnitude of this effect, i.e. the “pass-through rate,” depends on several market 
characteristics. One such market characteristic is the extent of market competition among air 
carriers. Our theoretical model predicts that the size of pass-through becomes larger when markets 
are more competitive. Another market characteristic that also plays a role in affecting the size of 
pass-through is the distance between origin and destination. Consistent with what our theoretical 
model predicts, our empirical results reveal that there is a systematic positive marginal effect of 
crude oil price on airfare in U.S. domestic air travel markets. Furthermore, the magnitude of the 
pass-through rate depends on the competitiveness of the relevant U.S. domestic air travel market.  
In particular, the pass-through rate tends to be greater in more competitive markets. The empirical 
results also suggest that the pass-through rate is smaller in longer distance markets.   
                                                 
8 This term “price transmission” has been used interchangeably with “cost pass-through” in many empirical works 
that study the cost-price pass-through relationship in a variety of markets, such as Azzam (1999), Gomez and Koerner 
(2002), Aguiar and Santana (2002), Krivonos (2004), Frey and Manera (2005), Leibtag et. al. (2007), Bonnet and 
Villas-Boas (2016) and many others. However, these studies focus on the asymmetric patterns of cost-price pass-
through in their markets of interest, which is not the focus in this paper.   
7 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the relevant literature. 
In section 3 we specify and analyze a simple theoretical model of air travel demand and supply in 
an origin-destination market. Section 4 provides the empirical analysis, which starts by describing 
the data, then specifying and estimating the empirical model, and discussing the empirical results. 
Concluding remarks are gathered in section 5. 
 
 1.2 Related Literature 
Empirical studies that focus on the cost-price pass-through relationship have been done on 
various industries. In the energy sector, Alexeeva-Talebi (2011) examines the impact of 
introducing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on the unleaded petrol retail prices in 14 EU 
Member States. In the retail food industry, Berck et al (2009) studies the pass-through from price 
shocks of certain raw commodities (corn, wheat, and gasoline) to supermarket retail prices of 
ready-to-eat cereals and fresh chicken. Kim and Cotterill (2008) estimates the pass-through rate of 
increases in milk prices to cheese prices.  Bonnet and Villas-Boas (2016) focus on the French 
coffee market and studies the asymmetric pass-through patterns of retail coffee prices in response 
to upstream cost shocks. In the automobile industry, Gron and Swenson (2000) investigates how 
exchange rate changes influence the manufacturers’ input market decisions and the importance of 
accounting for this impact on the estimated pass-through rate as a result of exchange rate changes. 
Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2010) studies the relationship between a firm’s degree of vertical 
integration along the supply chain and its pass-through of exchange-rate-induced cost shocks to 
the retail prices in the U.S. auto industry.  
8 
In the airline industry, airline cost structure has been well explored by a considerable 
number of studies.9  However, there has been a scarcity of studies that focus on the cost-price pass-
through relationship. A subset of these studies on the airline industry is purely theoretical analysis 
that examines the impact of cost-side shocks on airfare, product quality, airline performance, and 
other market outcome variables. Forsyth (2008) studies the impact of climate change policies, such 
as carbon taxes or carbon emission permits (referred to as an increase in “effective price of fuel”10) 
on competition, airfare, and profitability. The author found that the impact differs by market 
structure. The relevant metric of market structure being whether the airline city-pair market is 
competitive, monopolistic or oligopolistic. The author also argues that airlines are unlikely to be 
able to pass on the full cost change to airfare in the short run, though in the long run, it is likely 
that airlines will exit from some city pairs, and this will enable the remaining airlines to raise their 
fares and restore their profitability. Using a theoretical model, Brueckner and Zhang (2010) 
examine the effect of airline emission charges on airfare, airline service quality, and network 
structure. They find that an increase in spot market fuel prices, or an equivalent imposition of 
                                                 
9 Hirsch (2006) and Neven, Roller, and Zhang (2006) focus on airline labor input and show that labor cost should be 
endogenous to airline profits as airlines and unions both exhibit some bargaining power in terms of airline workers 
wage level. Ryerson and Hansen (2013) examine how jet fuel price influences aircraft operating costs using two types 
of operating cost models and find that fuel price plays a large role in airlines’ decision on choosing the optimal aircraft 
size in order to minimize operating cost per seat mile. Windle (1991), Zuidberg (2014) and Bitzan and Peoples (2016) 
also find the positive impact of jet fuel price on airline operating cost. 
10 Many studies that are conducted with respect to the economic effects of the introduction of European Emission 
Trading Scheme in the aviation sector adopt the similar idea, i.e. either increasing spot market jet fuel prices, a carbon-
tax scheme or carbon emission permits charge is effectively viewed as equivalent to an increase in jet fuel prices paid 
by airlines. These studies include but are not limited to Forsyth (2008), Brueckner and Zhang (2010), Toru (2011), 
Malina et al. (2012), Brueckner and Abreu (2016). 
9 
airline emission charges, will lead to a higher airfare, lower flight frequency, higher load factor, 
and more fuel-efficient aircrafts.  
Empirical studies such as Malina et al. (2012), evaluate the economic impact of the 
European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) on U.S. airlines. They find the impact to be relatively 
small. The rationale posited is that U.S. airlines may not pass through to airfare the full cost of 
emission charge since the imperfectly competitive market structure facilitates airlines with market 
power to absorb part of the cost increase. Koopmans and Lieshout (2016) attempt to identify the 
most likely pass-through rates for aviation markets for different countries based on previous 
theoretical findings of the pass-through rate in various market settings.11 They compute 
concentration level (measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) for each aviation market and 
suggest that most aviation markets in the world can be characterized as an oligopoly with 
differentiated products. Based on the pass-through rates in differentiated oligopolies computed by 
Zimmerman and Carlson (2010), Koopmans and Lieshout (2016) further suggest that an airline-
specific cost shock is likely to have a less than 50 percent pass-through to airfare, but an industry-
wide cost shock will have a larger pass-through to airfare depending on the degree of competition 
between airlines.   
                                                 
11 Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) compute the pass-through rates in a perfect competitive environment and in 
monopolistic market. They find that an industry-wide cost change will be completely passed along to consumers in a 
perfect competitive market. A monopolist with a constant marginal cost will pass through 50 percent of a marginal 
cost change to market price when facing a linear demand. Zimmerman and Carlson (2010) focus on analyzing the role 
of product differentiation on firm-specific and industry-wide pass-through rates. They find disparate pass-through 
across the Cournot and Bertrand models. In differentiated oligopoly markets with Cournot type, firm-specific pass-
through rates are between 20 percent and 50 percent and sector-wide pass-through rates are greater than the above 
range. Whereas in Bertrand type market structure, firm-specific pass-through rates are less than 50 percent while 
greater than 50 percent for sector-wide cost shocks. 
10 
Duplantis (2011) examines conditions under which airline fuel costs are passed on to 
consumers and estimates the respective fuel cost pass-through rates under these conditions. The 
author uses reduced-form regression analysis and finds an industry-wide fuel pass-through rate of 
0.08 during periods of constant capacity, and 0.89 during periods of changing capacity. This 
finding is somewhat in line with the argument made by Borenstein and Rose (2007) that fuel cost 
is relatively fixed unless the airline can quickly adjust capacity with fuel price changes. Toru 
(2011) studies how airlines fuel cost increase triggered by increasing jet fuel price and 
environmental policy change is passed through to airfare in the EU airline market and its impact 
on air traffic, airline profits and consumer welfare. Specifically, the author uses a structural 
econometric model with standard logit demand and Bertrand-type market competition to compute 
the pass-through rates under counterfactual experiments with increases in “effective jet fuel price”. 
The average estimated pass-through rates under these simulations fall into the range of 0.985 to 
0.989 when the corresponding jet fuel price or an equivalent emission charge increase by 50% to 
500%. The author suggests that the European airline market is highly competitive and that airlines 
are able to pass most of the fuel cost changes to passengers. This result to some extent is close to 
the finding in PWC (2005), which finds aviation fuel pass-through rates of 90% for low-cost 
carriers and 105% for full-service carriers.12  
Our paper is different from the above studies in the following ways. First, unlike previous 
studies, we consider both demand-side and supply-side market channels through which changes in 
crude oil price pass-through to airfare. For example, on the air travel demand side, changes in 
crude oil price, through the pressure placed on gasoline price, trigger changes in consumer 
substitution between air travel and private automobile travel in shorter distance markets. On the 
                                                 
12 The results suggest that it takes up to two years for the full pass-through impact to become apparent. (Page 43) 
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air travel supply side, changes in crude oil price spur changes in jet fuel price, which in turn causes 
airline fuel costs to change. However, it is important to note that the demand-driven price 
transmission channel considered in our analysis has not been considered in the aforementioned 
literature.13 Second, unlike previous studies our empirical model allows airline-specific 
characteristics to affect market airfare level as well as the rate of cost pass-through. Particularly, 
we consider the role that airline jet fuel hedging decisions may play in influencing the size of fuel 
cost pass-through.14   
 
 1.3 Theoretical Model 
The purpose of this section is to provide a simple theoretical framework to describe market 
mechanisms through which changes in crude oil price pass through to airfare, as well as to reveal 
and better understand some underlying factors that may play a role in influencing the size of pass-
through. The theoretical model comprises both demand and supply sides of the market for air 
travel.  
To construct our consumer demand function, we consider the potential substitution 
between air travel and private automobile travel, which depends on the market distance between 
origin and destination. In line with the argument made by Hayashi and Trapani (1987), the 
substitutability between flying and driving is influenced by the relevant ground transport cost, 
                                                 
13 We find one exception by Hayashi and Trapani (1987) who explicitly model the role of energy costs in affecting 
both demand and supply side of US air travel market.  
14 Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2004), find that jet fuel hedging is positively related to airline firm value, and “hedging 
premium” constitutes approximately 12-16% increase in firm value. 
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determined by gasoline price and time spent driving.15 Following the argument made by Hayashi 
and Trapani (1987), air travel as well as other modes of mass transit, become relatively cheaper 
compared with private automobile travel when there is an increase in gasoline price. Therefore, 
we introduce gasoline price into the air travel demand equation. In terms of air travel supply, we 
consider airline fuel cost as a major component of airline operating costs, and therefore it is directly 
affected by jet fuel price. Due to the fact that both gasoline and jet fuel are petroleum products that 
are refined from crude oil,16 changes in their prices are driven by changes in crude oil price.   
In summary, our discussion above posits that changes in crude oil price affect both the 
demand and supply sides of air travel markets. In particular, we posit that crude oil price changes 
affect the demand for air travel via influencing the relative cost of automobile travel through causal 
changes in gasoline price, while the supply side of air travel is affected due to causal changes in 
jet fuel price.  Consistent with these arguments, Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 show that crude oil, 
gasoline, and jet fuel prices are positively correlated. 
                                                 
15 Hayashi and Trapani (1987) consider the total ground transport cost of a trip is the sum of gasoline consumption 
valued at current cost per gallon, and time cost valued at average hourly earnings of non-supervisory personnel for all 
industries in the US. However, to simply the analysis in our model, we do not explicitly model the time spent on 
driving.  
16 http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=oil_refining.  
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Figure 1.3 Energy Prices in Dollar Value 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
Figure 1.4 Energy Prices in Percentage Change 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
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 1.3.1 Demand 
We think of an air travel market as directional travel between a specific origin and 
destination, while an air travel product is the specific routing used when transporting passengers 
from the origin to destination. As such, a given origin-destination market may have several 
competing products that are differentiated by their routing.  
Following from Shubik-Levitan demand,17 air travel demand among 𝑛 differentiated air 






)     (1.1) 
which can be written more compactly as:  
𝑞𝑖 = 𝐻 − 𝛽𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽∑ 𝑃𝑗
𝑛−1
𝑗≠𝑖    for all 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛    (1.2) 
where 
𝐻 = ℎ0 + ℎ1𝑋 + 𝛾𝑃𝑔      (1.3) 
𝛾 = 𝑒−𝛾0𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡       (1.4) 
𝛽 = 𝑒−𝛽0𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡       (1.5) 
𝑃𝑔 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑃𝑐      (1.6) 
In the equations above, 𝑞𝑖 represents the demand level for air travel product 𝑖, and 𝑃𝑖 is the 
associated price level for product 𝑖, where  𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛. All other products are considered to be 
substitute goods to product 𝑖, placing an equal weight of impact on product 𝑖’s demand, which is 
measured by parameter 𝛽 > 0; 𝑋 is a vector of variables that influence the level of air travel 
demand, while ℎ1 is a vector of parameters that capture the marginal demand impact of each of 
                                                 
17 A demand system outlined and discussed in Shubik and Levitan (1980). 
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the variables in 𝑋, respectively;  𝑃𝑔 and 𝑃𝑐 represent gasoline price and crude oil price respectively; 
while 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a metric of market distance, measured by the non-stop flying distance between the 
origin and destination of the market.   
As discussed previously, it is expected that consumers’ preference between private 
automobile travel and air travel depends on the relative cost between the two modes of 
transportation. We use non-stop flying miles between the market’s endpoints as an index of the 
market distance.  The assumption is that this metric of market distance is positively correlated with 
driving distance. We also assume that the cost to the consumer of automobile travel, which 
includes the opportunity cost of time, increases faster with market distance compared to the cost 
to the consumer of air travel. As such, at any given gasoline price and jet fuel price, the cost to the 
consumer of flying relative to driving decreases with market distance. To capture these ideas in 
the system of air travel demand equations, we assume that 𝛾, which measures the direct marginal 
effect of gasoline price on air travel demand, is positive and a decreasing function of market 
distance since parameter 𝛾0 > 0. Through parameter 𝛿1 > 0, the positive marginal effect of 
gasoline price on air travel demand is translated into an indirect positive marginal effect of crude 
oil price on air travel demand.   
Therefore, the system of demand equations is specified to capture the fact that automobile 
travel is normally considered as a closer substitute to air travel at relatively shorter travel 
distances.18 Following this rationale, it is likely that gasoline price tends to have a larger impact 
on the air travel demand in short-haul markets. That is, changes in gasoline price should more 
heavily influence consumers’ choice between driving and flying in markets with relatively shorter 
                                                 
18 Berry, Carnall and Spiller (1996, Page 13) also make similar arguments.  
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travel distances. However, as the market distance becomes relatively longer, travelers are less 
likely to switch from flying to driving. In this case, gasoline price changes may have a smaller 
impact on consumers’ air travel demand, perhaps largely driven by the high opportunity cost of 
time associated with long-distance travel by driving. It then can be inferred that the crude oil price 
changes affect short-haul market demand relatively more intensively than longer distance market 
demand given the linkage between gasoline price and crude oil price (𝛿1 > 0). 
Suggested by Gillen et al (2003), to account for the different elasticity of air travel demand 
in markets of differing distances, we consider the argument that travelers are likely to be more 
(less) sensitive to airfare changes in shorter (longer) distance markets. That is, air travel demand 
tends to be more elastic in shorter-haul markets than it is in longer-haul markets, simply because 
driving is often considered to be a more realistic alternative in relative shorter distance travel. We 
capture this effect by specifying 𝛽 to be a decreasing function of market distance based on an 
exponential functional form with 𝛽0 > 0. It is easier to see the relationship between market 












𝑗≠𝑖  for all 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛   (1.7) 
Given the above inverse air travel demand equation, as well as the relationship between 𝛽 
and distance specified in equation (5), it is evident that 𝛽 gets smaller as market distance increases, 
and smaller 𝛽 corresponds to a steeper inverse demand curve, suggesting that demand is less elastic 
in longer distance markets.   
We make a standard assumption when specifying a system of demand equations, which is 
that the demand impact of own price changes is greater than cross-price demand impacts, i.e. 𝛽 >
𝛽, suggesting that own price elasticity is greater than cross-price elasticity for a given price level. 
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 1.3.2 Supply Relation: Bertrand – Nash Pricing Game 
We assume each of the n differentiated air travel products is offered by a different airline.  
As such, the system of n profit functions across competing airlines in the origin-destination market 






)     (1.8) 
where 𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑛 are the marginal costs firms incur to provide products 1,2, … , 𝑛, 
respectively. We assume that airlines simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose prices, 
Bertrand-Nash fashion, to maximize profit. The set of prices in a Nash equilibrium must satisfy 
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     (1.10) 
Following the approach described in Wang and Zhao (2007), let 𝐵 =
1
𝑎




 , 𝑏 = 𝑎𝛽 =
?̃?
2𝛽+?̃?
, 𝐼 is an 𝑛 × 𝑛 identity matrix, and 𝑇 is an 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix of ones. The 
inverse of matrix B is given by:  
𝐵−1 = 𝑎 [𝐼 +
𝑏
1−𝑛𝑏
𝑇]      (1.11) 
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We focus on a Nash Equilibrium in which products have strictly positive prices (𝑃𝑖 > 0) 
and production levels (𝑞𝑖 > 0). The system of first-order conditions yields the following 




















































For any airline 𝑖, the optimal airfare 𝑃𝑖 is: 
𝑃𝑖 = (𝑎 +
𝑛𝑎𝑏
1−𝑛𝑏
)𝐻 + (𝑎𝛽 +
𝑎𝑏𝛽
1−𝑛𝑏





𝑗≠𝑖 ;  for 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛  (1.13) 












𝑗≠𝑖    (1.14) 
The assumption of strictly positive prices and quantities implies that 2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 > 0 
for any given number of firms, n, where 𝑛=1, 2, …. Implications of the assumption of strictly 
positive prices and quantities are summarized in Lemma 1 (see Appendix for the proof).  
Lemma 1: Assume positive prices and quantities for each firm 𝑖=1,2,…,𝑛 in Nash 



















2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 > 0
(2𝛽 + 𝛽)𝐻 + 𝛽[2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽]𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽(∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 ) > 0
(2𝛽 + 𝛽)𝐻 − (𝛽 + 𝛽)[2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽]𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽(∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 ) > 0
𝑐𝑖 > 0
𝐻 > 0
𝛽 > 𝛽 > 0
     






)      (1.15) 
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which can be written more compactly as: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑖𝑃𝑓 + 𝛼2𝑍  for all 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛   (1.16) 
where 
𝑃𝑓 = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝑃𝑐      (1.17) 
In the equations above, 𝑐𝑖 represents the marginal cost of air travel product 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛; 
𝑍 is a vector of cost-shifting variables that affect an airline’s marginal cost; and 𝑃𝑓 represents jet 
fuel price. We assume the parameter 𝛼1𝑖 > 0, which captures the direct positive marginal effect of 
jet fuel price on an airline’s marginal cost; and through the assumption that parameter 𝜙1 > 0, this 
effect translates into the indirect positive marginal effect of crude oil price on an airline’s marginal 
cost.  
Substituting equations (16) and (17) into the solution equation (equation (14)) for Nash 
equilibrium price yields the following reduced-form equation for Nash equilibrium price for air 
travel product 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛: 
𝑷𝒊

































𝜙0    (1.19) 
𝜃 ≡ {𝛽0, 𝛽, ℎ0, ℎ1, 𝛾0, 𝛼0, 𝛼1𝑖, 𝛼1𝑗, 𝛼2, 𝛿0, 𝛿1, 𝜙0, 𝜙1}   (1.20) 
20 
The expression above that characterizes the Nash equilibrium price level reveals that airline 
𝑖’s optimal airfare in a given origin-destination market is determined by:  
(i) 𝑋, 𝑍: vectors of demand-shifting and cost-shifting variables, respectively;  
(ii) 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡: market distance measured by non-stop flying miles between the origin and 
destination;  
(iii) 𝑃𝑐: the level of crude oil price, which influences airfare through air travel demand and 
supply channels.  
(iv) 𝐻0: a component that comprises a composite of demand and cost factors that determine 
the mean level of airline 𝑖’s fare when the variables described in (i) through (iii) above are 
counterfactually set equal to zero. 
 
 1.3.3 Theoretical Analysis 
 1.3.3.1 The impact of crude oil price on airfare 
The marginal effect of crude oil price on a typical airline’s price level determines the cost 
pass-through relationship, or price transmission, from changes in crude oil price to changes in 
airfare. As such, the cost pass-through relationship is derived from our theoretical model based on 











𝜙1⏟                    
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡






𝜙1⏟                    
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
     (1.21) 
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The above equation suggests that changes in crude oil price are translated into changes in 
airfare through two market channels: demand-side and supply-side. The following provides 
intuitive descriptions of the demand-side effect, as well as the two supply-side effects:  
 Demand effect: The demand effect captures how crude oil price changes affect air travel 
demand. This effect is positive according to our previous discussion.  An increase 
(decrease) in crude oil price pushes up (down) gasoline price, leading to higher (lower) air 
travel demand as driving becomes relatively more (less) costly.  The higher (lower) demand 
for air travel causes airfare to rise (fall). This demand effect is stronger in shorter distance 
markets as driving is a closer substitute for flying at shorter distances. 
 Direct cost effect: The direct cost effect captures the portion of airline 𝑖’s optimal airfare 
response to changes in its own marginal cost, where the marginal cost changes are driven 
by changes in crude oil price. This direct cost effect is positive, and therefore consistent 
with the argument that an increase (decrease) in crude oil price causes an increase 
(decrease) in jet fuel price. The increase (decrease) in jet fuel price causes an increase 
(decrease) in the airline’s own marginal cost, which then causes an increase (decrease) in 
the airline’s optimal airfare.   
 Strategic cost effect: The strategic cost effect captures the extent to which airline 𝑖’s 
optimal airfare responds to changes in the marginal cost of rival airlines, where the rival 
airlines’ marginal cost changes are driven by changes in crude oil price. This strategic cost 
effect results from the strategic interdependence across competing oligopolistic firms in a 
market, a feature of our model that results from the assumed Bertrand-Nash price-setting 
game played between airlines. The strategic cost effect is positive, reflecting the argument 
that an increase (decrease) in crude oil price increases (decreases) the marginal cost and 
22 
consequently the airfare of an airline’s rivals, which causes the airline to increase 
(decrease) its original airfare in response to the increase (decrease) in airfare of its rivals. 
Due to the strategic interdependence across competing oligopolistic airlines, it is important 
to note that the strategic effect facilitates a positive correlation between an airline’s fare 
and crude oil price, even in an extreme situation in which the airline’s own marginal cost 
is insensitive to crude oil price changes. 
Proposition 1: The marginal effect of crude oil price on an airline’s optimal airfare is 





The inequality in Proposition 1 holds given 2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 > 0 according to Lemma 1 
and the positive correlation among energy prices, i.e. 𝛿1, 𝜙1 > 0.  Proposition 1 implies that as 
crude oil price increases (decreases), the equilibrium airfare charged by airline 𝑖 also increases 
(decreases).  As suggested by Zimmerman and Carlson (2010), “a positive cost pass-through rate 
means that some portion of a marginal cost change will be passed through to price regardless of 
the level of competition”. 
 
 1.3.3.2 The impact of an airline’s jet fuel hedging decision on the cost pass-through 
rate 
We now consider how the size of the pass-through from changes in crude oil price to airfare 
may be affected by an airlines’ fuel hedging strategy. Airline service is heavily dependent on the 
price and availability of jet fuel.  High volatility in fuel costs, increased fuel price, and significant 
disruptions in the supply of aircraft fuel can have a significant negative impact on airlines’ regular 
operations. Airlines often enter into fuel hedging contracts, such as forward contracts, futures 
contracts, options, swaps, and collars, to lock in future fuel prices and thus reduce their exposure 
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to rising fuel costs.19 We expect airlines that extensively use fuel hedging contracts are likely to 
experience a smaller impact from short-term fuel price swings resulting from crude oil market 
fluctuation. This effect is captured in our model by a relatively small 𝛼1𝑖 for airline 𝑖 in the 
marginal cost equation, which is equation (16) above. Proposition 2 summarizes how the model 
captures the impact of airline jet fuel hedging decisions on the size of pass-through from changes 
in crude oil price to airfare: 
Proposition 2: The size of pass-through from changes in crude oil price to an airline’s 
optimal fare is greater the larger parameter 𝛼1𝑖 is in the airline’s marginal cost function, i.e. for 








, 𝒊𝒇 𝜶𝟏𝒊 > 𝜶𝟏𝒋. 
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(𝛼1𝑖 − 𝛼1𝑗)  (1.22) 








> 0 holds if and only if 𝛼1𝑖 − 𝛼1𝑗 > 0.  










> 0;  when 2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 > 0    (1.23) 
The above equation states that the larger 𝛼1𝑖 is, the larger the impact of crude oil price on 
airline 𝑖’s optimal price level.  Intuitively, we may rationalize this effect in the following way:  
airlines who enter jet fuel hedging contracts, which cause a smaller 𝛼1i, tend to experience smaller 
changes in their marginal cost from crude oil price shocks compared to airlines that do not use fuel 
                                                 
19 There are considerable studies that focus on how airline fuel hedging strategies affect airlines in terms of firm market 
value and risk management (see Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006a, 2006b), Morrell and Swan (2006), and Treanor 
et al. (2014)).  
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hedging contracts.  In this case, the latter airlines are more likely to pass along the crude oil price 
shocks to consumers through airfare.  
 
 1.3.3.3 The impact of market competition on the cost pass-through rate 
We now consider how the size of pass-through from changes in crude oil price to airfare 
may vary with the level of market competition, where the degree of market competition is 
measured in the model by the number of airlines that compete in the market, 𝑛. The impact of air 
travel market competition intensity on the size of crude oil price pass-through to airfare is 
described in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3:  The extent of pass-through from changes in crude oil price to airfare 
increases with the number of firms in the market, that is, the pass-through rate is greater in more 
































2  (1.24) 
The sign of the above equation is positive given 𝛽, 𝛽 > 0 and 𝛾, 𝛼1𝑗 , 𝛿1, 𝜙1 > 0, suggesting 
that an increase in 𝑛 corresponds to a higher pass-through rate. As the market becomes more 
competitive with a growing number of firms, these firms are likely to compete more aggressively 
in prices, leaving smaller and smaller profit margins. A profit maximizing firm will quickly adjust 
its optimal price after a cost shock, holding the belief that its rivals will react similarly to the cost 
shock. As such, a cost shock is likely to pass-through into new equilibrium prices on a larger scale 
25 
when markets are more competitive. This interpretation complies with the argument made by 
Koopmans and Lieshout (2016) and Malina et al. (2012) that when markets become more 
competitive, profits margins decline, which leaves little room for airlines to absorb costs without 
passing through cost increase to prices. In summary, airlines are more likely to pass cost changes 
to airfare when market competition is more intense. 
 
 1.3.3.4 The impact of market distance on the cost pass-through rate 
Our theory suggests that consumer preference between air travel and private automobile 
travel depends on the relevant ground transport cost in transporting them from origin to destination. 
An essential factor that determines the ground transport cost is the market distance between the 
two endpoints of the market. We use the air travel non-stop flying miles between the origin and 
destination as an index for the driving distance between the two endpoints. As revealed in our 
specification of air travel demand in equations (2), (3), (4) and (5), market distance affects both 
the level of air travel demand (captured by 𝛾 = 𝑒−𝛾0𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡) and the elasticity of the air travel demand 
(captured by 𝛽 = 𝑒−𝛽0𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡). As revealed in equation (18), market distance influences Nash 
equilibrium prices both from influencing the level of demand through 𝑒−𝛾0𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡, and the elasticity 
of demand through 𝑒−𝛽0𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡. Hence, we consider the overall impact of market distance on cost 
pass-through rate to be split into two effects: “level effect” and “elasticity effect”. For a given 
number of firms in the market, the overall effect is calculated by partially differentiating the cost 
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𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 (+)
    (1.25) 
The first term on the right-hand-side of equation (25), which we label the “level effect”, is 
influenced by 𝑒−𝛾0𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡, but not influenced by 𝑒−𝛽0𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡. The “level effect” measures the extent to 
which market distance affects airlines’ adjustment of their optimal prices as a response to crude 
oil price changes driven by the likelihood of consumers switching between air travel and private 
automobile travel due to changes of ground transport cost induced by gasoline price changes. 
Intuitively, an increase in crude oil price leads to an increase in gasoline price, which increases the 
expense of driving relative to the expense of air travel. Air travel in this case becomes more 
attractive, shifting the demand curve outward as consumers switch from driving to air travel. The 
27 
magnitude of the shift of air travel demand depends on the market distance between origin and 
destination. The magnitude of the demand shift is large for short distance travel compared with 
long distance travel because it is much easier for consumers to switch between driving and flying 
when the origin and destination are close to each other. Thus, we expect there are more consumers 
switching from driving to flying for short distance travel when gasoline price increases, i.e. 
gasoline price changes are predicted to be more impactful on consumers decision to drive versus 
fly in shorter distance markets.  
The level effect term in equation (25) is negative, implying that a shorter market distance 
causes a higher cost pass-through rate owing to the level effect. We use Figure 1.5 to better 
illustrate the level effect. In order to focus on the impact of the level effect, we keep the elasticity 
of air travel demand constant across markets of different distances. A simplified assumption to 
illustrate the level effect is to let the initial demand curve, 𝐷0, represent both the initial short-
distance and long-distance market demand. In addition, the associated equilibrium price level, 𝑃0, 
which is found by equating the initial marginal cost curve, 𝑀𝐶0 to the initial marginal revenue 
curve, 𝑀𝑅0 at 𝐸0 for a typical oligopolistic firm 𝑖, represents both the initial short-distance and 
long-distance equilibrium market price level.  
Consider now a cost shock resulting from an increase in crude oil price level, which shifts 
𝑀𝐶0 upward to 𝑀𝐶1. It is expected that this shock is more impactful in the short-distance market 
by shifting the initial short-distance market demand, 𝐷0, rightward to 𝐷1
𝑆, which is a larger shift 
than the resulting new long-distance market demand, 𝐷1
𝐿. The associated new marginal revenue 
curves for the new short-distance and new long-distance market demand are 𝑀𝑅1
𝑆, 𝑀𝑅1
𝐿 
respectively. The new profit-maximizing price levels, 𝑃1
𝑆 , 𝑃1
𝐿, corresponding to the new short- and 
long-distance market demand are found by equating the new marginal revenue, 𝑀𝑅1
𝑆, 𝑀𝑅1
𝐿, to the 
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new marginal cost curves, 𝑀𝐶1, at 𝐸1
𝑆, 𝐸1
𝐿 respectively. It is evident that a larger rightward shift of 





𝐿 − 𝑃0, suggesting a higher pass-through rate for a given cost shock, Δ𝑀𝐶, in a 
shorter distance market than it is in a longer distance market. Meanwhile, the nature of the 
oligopolistic market structure suggests that this cost-price pass-through is likely to be incomplete 
for a typical oligopolistic firm 𝑖. That is, the maximum change in equilibrium airfare tends to be 
less than the change in marginal cost for a given cost shock, i.e. Δ𝑃𝑖
𝑆 ≤ Δ𝑀𝐶. 
 
Figure 1.5 Illustrating the level effect using a simple diagram 
 
The last three terms in equation (25) together capture what we call the elasticity effect of 
market distance on the cost pass-through rate. The elasticity effect measures the extent to which 
market distance affects an airline’s optimal airfare response to crude oil price changes based on 
consumers’ sensitivities to changes of airfare. The intuition is that short-distance travelers tend to 
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be more sensitive to airfare changes than long-distance travelers, simply because driving is often 
not a realistic alternative to air travel in long distance markets. As such, we would expect airlines 
to pass along a crude oil price induced cost shock to airfare more heavily to long distance air 
travelers given their less elastic air travel demand compared to consumers in short-haul distance 
markets. Another way to understand airlines’ pass-through behavior in this analysis is to think 
about how much output they have to sacrifice to pass on a certain amount of the change in their 
marginal costs.20 A pass-through will be larger for the less elastic long-distance air travel demand 
because the reduction of quantity demand is smaller for a given increase in airfare, thus making 
passing the cost shock through to airfare more attractive than in short-haul distance markets. 
In contrast to the negative impact of the level effect of market distance on cost pass-through 
rate in equation (25), the elasticity effect is positive, suggesting that the cost pass-through rate is 
smaller in shorter distance markets. We use Figure 1.6 to better illustrate the elasticity effect. When 
we consider the elasticity effect, we focus on analyzing differing elasticity of air travel demand 
between short-haul and long-haul markets, assuming no level effect is induced by differing market 
distance.  
To simplify the illustration, we assume the initial equilibrium airfare for the more elastic 
short-distance market is the same level as the initial equilibrium airfare for the less elastic long-
distance market, 𝑃0, which is found by equating their associated marginal revenue curves, 
𝑀𝑅𝑆, 𝑀𝑅𝐿, to the initial marginal cost curve, 𝑀𝐶0, at 𝐸0
𝑆 , 𝐸0
𝐿, respectively. Consider now a cost 
shock resulting from an increase in crude oil price level, causing and upward shift in marginal cost 
from 𝑀𝐶0 to 𝑀𝐶1. The new 𝑀𝐶1 curve intersects the short-distance marginal revenue curve, 𝑀𝑅𝑆, 
                                                 
20 Cost pass-though: theory, measurement, and potential policy implications. RBB Economics, February 2014. 
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at 𝐸1
𝑆 and the long-distance marginal revenue curve, 𝑀𝑅𝐿, at 𝐸1
𝐿. The resulting new profit-
maximizing price level for the long-distance market is notably greater than that for the short-
distance market, i.e. 𝑃1
𝐿 > 𝑃1
𝑆, suggesting a greater equilibrium increase in airfare for the less 
elastic long-distance market demand than in the more elastic short-distance market for a given cost 
shock, i.e. 𝛥𝑃𝑖
𝐿 = 𝑃1
𝐿 − 𝑃0 >  𝛥𝑃𝑖
𝑆 = 𝑃1
𝑆 − 𝑃0. In other words, the changes in Figure 1.6 reveal 
that the elasticity effect drives a higher pass-through rate for a given cost shock, Δ𝑀𝐶, in a short 
distance market compared to a long distance market. Similar to the previous discussion, it is 
expected that the maximum change in equilibrium airfare is less than the change in marginal cost 
for a given cost shock of Δ𝑀𝐶, i.e. Δ𝑃𝑖
𝐿 ≤ Δ𝑀𝐶. 
 
Figure 1.6 Illustrating the elasticity effect using a simple diagram 
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In summary, it is important to note that the overall effect of market distance between origin 
and destination on the size of pass-through from changes in crude oil price to airfare is determined 
by the relative strengths of two offsetting effects, the level effect and elasticity effect. This result 
is summarized in Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4: The impact of market distance between origin and destination on the size 
of pass-through from changes in crude oil price to airline market fare levels is governed by two 
offsetting effects: a negative “level effect” and a positive “elasticity effect”. Specifically, the 
negative “level effect” implies that the cost pass-through rate is smaller in longer distance 
markets, while the positive “elasticity effect” implies that the cost pass-through rate is larger in 
longer distance markets. Therefore, the sign of the overall pass-through rate effect of market 
distance is determined by the relative strengths of the “level effect” and the “elasticity effect”.  
 
 1.4 Empirical Analysis  
We now analyze whether the theoretical predictions above are supported by systematic 
patterns across a sample of U.S. domestic origin-destination air travel markets. We start by 
describing the data sample used in the empirical analysis and then describe the empirical model 
used for analyzing the data, followed by a discussion of results from the empirical model.  
 
 1.4.1 Data 
We use data from three main sources. The airline ticket information data are the Passenger 
Origin-Destination Survey of the U.S. Department of Transportation (database DB1B). These data 
are a 10% quarterly random sample of all airline tickets. The DB1B database provides information 
on flight fares; itinerary (origins, destinations, and all connecting airports on a given itinerary); the 
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identity of ticketing and operating carriers for each flight segment on the itinerary; the type of 
ticket (i.e. round-trip or one-way); the number of passengers traveling on the itinerary at a given 
fare in each origin-destination pair; itinerary miles flown in transporting the passenger from origin 
to destination; and non-stop flight distance between the origin and destination.21 Following 
Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), information on the population of each origin and destination city is 
based on the Population Estimates Program (PEP) of the U.S. Census Bureau, which produces 
annual population estimates under the category “Cities and Towns (Incorporated Places and Minor 
Civil Division)."22 We use the energy price data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) under “short-term energy outlook,"23 including gasoline, jet fuel, and crude oil prices24. Last, 
we collected the information regarding airlines’ jet fuel hedging strategy adopted in our data file 
from their Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings (i.e. their 10-K filing).   
 
 1.4.1.1 Sample Selection 
The DB1B raw data file contains millions of tickets for each quarter during the year. For 
instance, the number of records in the third quarter of 2013 is 5,749,897. To construct our working 
sample, we focus on the last two quarters of 2013,25 and all four quarters of 2014 and 2015, a total 
                                                 
21 The URL of this data source is: http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Tables.asp?DB_ID=125.  
22 The URL of this data source is: http://www.census.gov/popest/data/index.html.  
23 The URL of the data source is: https://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/query/.  
24 Crude oil is represented by Brent Crude Oil since this is the primary energy index that most US airlines follow for 
fuel hedging; gasoline is using “all grades retail price including taxes US average;” and jet fuel price is the price of 
“jet fuel refiner price to end users.” All energy prices are deflated in the 2014 dollar using consumer price index (CPI) 
that was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
25 Before this sample period, American Airlines and US airways announced plans to merge in February 2013 and was 
approved by US Airways shareholders in July 2013. This merger was challenged by the Department of Justice August 
2013 but soon was settled in November 2013. We assume that the market price change that might be influenced by 
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of ten quarters of data.  As previously shown in Figure 1.1, this time period spans relatively 
substantial fluctuations in crude oil price, and these fluctuations are important for empirical 
identification of the relationships between changes in crude oil price and airfares, which is key to 
achieve the key objectives of the analysis.   
We construct our DB1B working sample in the following manner: 
 Following Brueckner and Spiller (1994) and Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006), we 
keep only round-trip itineraries within the continental U.S. with at most four segments 
(i.e. no more than three intermediate stops). We eliminate all itineraries with market 
fares less than $50 or greater than $2,000. 
 A market is defined as a directional pair of an origin and a destination airport. For 
example, a direct flight from Atlanta to Boston is a different market than from Boston 
to Atlanta. This definition allows for the characteristics of the origin city to affect 
consumers’ air travel demand. As in Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006), the geometric 
mean of the population estimates in 2014 of the end-point cities characterizes a measure 
of the market size. 
 A product is defined as a unique combination of itinerary and operating carrier. A non-
stop flight from Atlanta to Boston operated by American Airline, for instance. We focus 
on products that use a single operating carrier for all segments of a given itinerary, i.e. 
                                                 
the AA-US Airways merger was realized when it was announced in the beginning of 2013 and thus our analysis of 
airline market fare during our sample period avoids the examination of the market price change that may contribute 
to the increasing market power caused by this merger. The idea is similar to the statement that Kim and Singal (1993) 
made in their study that “exercise of market power does not have to wait until merger completion…even without an 
explicit price-fixing agreement, the mere anticipation of a merger would make the participating firms more 
cooperative.” 
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pure online products. Table 1.2 lists the names and associated airline code of the 21 
carriers in our sample. 
 Product price and product quantity sold are obtained by averaging the market fare and 
aggregating the number of passengers, respectively, according to our definition of 
product. Thus, in the collapsed data, a product is a unique observation during a given 
time period. 
 
Table 1.2 List of Airlines in the Sample 
Airline Code Airline Name Airline Code Airline Name 
AA American Airlines OO SkyWest Airlines 
AS Alaska Airlines RP Chautauqua Airlines 
B6 JetBlue Airways S5 Shuttle America 
DL Delta Airlines SY Sun Country Airlines 
EV ExpressJet Airlines UA United Airlines 
F9 Frontier Airlines US US Airways 
FL AirTran Airways VX Virgin America 
G4 Allegiant Airlines WN Southwest Airlines 
G7 GoJet Airlines YV Mesa Airlines 
HA Hawaiian Airlines YX Midwest Airlines 
NK Spirit Airlines   
 
Unfortunately, one limitation of the DB1B data is that it does not contain passenger-
specific information and some important elements of product differentiation, such as departure 
times, how far in advance the ticket is purchased and length-of-stay requirements. The energy price 
data from EIA is available as a daily market spot price. With only quarterly airline data, we restrict 
our selection of energy prices to also be quarterly, i.e. the Brent crude oil, jet fuel, and gasoline 
prices are quarterly averaged market spot prices obtained from the EIA database. 
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 1.4.1.2 Data Summary 
Table 1.3 reports the summary statistics of our sample. Overall, we have 615,242 
observations/products in our sample and 147,073 markets based on our definitions of products and 
markets respectively. The quarterly average airfare, crude oil price, jet fuel price, and gasoline 
price in the sample are approximately $266, $81.53/barrel (or $1.94/gallon), $2.33/gallon, and 
$3.07/gallon respectively. The average market distance across all products is approximately 1414 
miles. To control for the likelihood that larger markets will have greater demand for air travel, we 
include the variable of 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 measured by the geometric mean of the population size in the 
origin and destination cities. Airfare is affected by market structure, product differentiation and 
other market or product level characteristics. To control for these market and product-level 
characteristics, we include other variables in the analysis. 
N_airline_mkt is a variable we constructed to serve as a measure of actual market 
competition, calculated by summing the number of distinct carriers serving the relevant market. A 
monopoly market is one with only one airline serving the market. There are at maximum 11 airlines 
competing in a market, and on average 4 airlines offering flight services in a market.  
To control for the likelihood that the threat of entry may affect equilibrium market fare, we 
include variables Threat_all and Threat_non_legacy, as measures of potential market competition. 
Following Gayle and Wu (2013) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), Threat_all is obtained by 
computing the number of all the distinct carriers that are present at both endpoints of a market 
without actually serving the market; and Threat_non_legacy is obtained by computing the number 
of all the distinct non-legacy carriers that are present at both endpoints of a market without actually 
serving the market. Following Berry and Jia (2010) and Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2013), carriers 
that are normally considered as legacy carriers include American Airlines, United, Delta, US 
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Airways, Alaska, Midwest, and Hawaiian Airlines.26 Non-legacy carriers include all the carriers 
in the dataset that are any of the seven carriers listed above as legacy carriers. The maximum 
number of carriers that place an entry threat without serving the market is 10, whereas the 
maximum number of non-legacy carriers that place an entry threat without serving the market is 
7. The three variables described above, N_airline_mkt, Threat_all, and Threat_non_legacy capture 
the structure and intensity of competition in each market, and used to control for the impact of 
these market structure factors on equilibrium airfares as well as their impact on the size of cost 
pass-through.  
Carriers may offer both non-stop and connecting service in a market. Consumers likely 
value the two types of products differently. To capture the difference in demand for these two 
types of air travel products, we use the variable Interstop as one measure of travel convenience of 
an itinerary. The variable is constructed by summing the number of intermediate stops in a 
product's itinerary. Therefore, it is expected that the more intermediate stops associated with an 
itinerary, the less convenient the air travel product is considered to be. However, there may exist 
products that have the same number of intermediate stops in an origin and destination market; but 
because the location(s) of the intermediate stop airport(s) are different, their associated itinerary 
flying miles will differ and thus exhibit different relative routing qualities. Following Chen and 
Gayle (2018), Gayle and Wu (2015), and Gayle and Le (2015), we use Inconvenience to measure 
the product routing quality which is not captured by the 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 variable. This variable is 
computed by dividing the itinerary miles flown from origin to destination by its corresponding 
                                                 
26 To construct all the entry threat variables, we place less restrictions on the DB1B dataset by not solely focusing on 
roundtrip itineraries. The less restrictive data thus includes carriers that may only place entry threat to the incumbents 
in a market by providing one-way flights at both endpoints without actually serving the market. These airlines will 
not be included in our final dataset, but are only used to measure the potential market competition.  
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non-stop radian distance. Thus, if an itinerary is a non-stop flight, then its 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 measure 
is 1. The maximum Inconvenience measure of a product in the data is about 3.7. This means 
travelers cover a 3.7 times longer distance with this product than the direct flight distance.  
Origin_Presence is a variable that measures the size of airlines’ operations at the market 
origin airport. This variable also captures the extent to which airlines use an origin airport as their 
hub.  Origin_Presence is constructed by aggregating the number of destinations that an airline 
connects with the origin city using non-stop flights. An airport from which an airline serves many 
destinations using non-stop flights is more likely to be a hub or a focus city for the airline, possibly 
providing better services, such as more frequent and convenient departure times for passengers. 
The summary statistics show that airlines serve, on average, about 26 different cities from the 
relevant market's origin cities. 
Fuel cost is one major component of airlines operating expenses. To protect against sudden 
losses from rising fuel prices or sudden gains from decreasing fuel prices, airlines usually use some 
form of hedging contract instrument to lock in fuel prices over a period of time, thus helping to 
mitigate fluctuations in the overall operating cost of the airline. We construct a zero-one dummy 
variable Hedge, which is assigned a value of 1 one if the carrier uses jet fuel hedging contracts. 








Table 1.3 Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Airfare* (dollars) 266.4667 107.9482 49.7374 1974.787 
Crude Oil Price* (dollars/barrel) 81.53147 27.08791 43.32127 112.0041 
Jet Fuel Price* (cents/gallon) 233.575 64.54691 136.8773 302.8977 
Gasoline Price* (cents/gallon) 307.1999 53.20798 225.2109 374.6044 
Quantity (numbers of passengers per product) 81.00224 375.4612 1 10294 
Interstop 1.006485 .5025355 0 3 
Inconvenience 1.242713 .3084797 .9972678 3.731755 
Origin_Presence 26.49011 24.91389 0 126 
N_airline_mkt 3.736166 2.166795 1 11 
Threat_all  1.139986 1.141304 0 10 
Threat_non_legacy 0.5373089 0.7417947 0 7 
Non-stop flight distance (miles) 1414.693 634.7927 70 2783 
Population 627422.8 606798.2 3017.846 5783171 
Hedge .8151882 .3881452 0 1 
Number of Products 615242 
Number of Markets 147073 
* Inflation-adjusted in 2014 dollar. 
 
In the next section, we use a simple reduced-form regression to empirically test the impact 
of crude oil price changes on airfare, and factors that affect the size of the pass-through.  
 
 1.4.2 Empirical Model 
Based on our theory, it has been argued that there exists a positive pass-through relationship 
from changes in crude oil price to airline market fare, and the size of this pass-through is affected 
by some market characteristics. In accordance with our theoretical predictions, we empirically 
estimate and test how various measures of market and airline characteristics affect the size of pass-
through: airline jet fuel hedging decisions, market competition and market distance between origin 
and destination.  
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 1.4.2.1 Reduced-form Regression Models 
Our empirical analysis relies on the following two reduced-form model specifications: 
Model I: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡) = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑖𝑚𝑡) + 𝜃2𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡      
+𝜃3 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑖𝑚𝑡) × 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡 + θ4𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡     
+𝜃5 log(𝑃𝑐,𝑖𝑚𝑡) × 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃6 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡)    
+𝜃7 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑖𝑚𝑡) × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡) + 𝜃8𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡    
+𝜃9 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑖𝑚𝑡) × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃10𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡     
+𝜃11𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃12𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡    
+𝜃13 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑡) + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑚 + 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡 (1.26) 
 
Model II: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡) = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑖𝑚𝑡) + 𝜃2𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡      
+𝜃3 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑖𝑚𝑡) × 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡 + θ4𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑡   
+𝜃5 log(𝑃𝑐,𝑖𝑚𝑡) × 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃6 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡)   
+𝜃7 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑖𝑚𝑡) × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡) + 𝜃8𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡    
+𝜃9 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑖𝑚𝑡) × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃10𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡     
+𝜃11𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃12𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡    
+𝜃13 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑡) + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑚 + 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡 (1.27) 
 
The dependent variable in each model is the airfare of product 𝑖 in market 𝑚 at time 𝑡, 
represented by 𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡. Both model specifications include the following control variables: 𝑃𝑐; 
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N_airline_mkt; distance; Hedge; Interstop; Inconvenience; Origin_Presence; Population; time 
fixed effects (𝜂𝑡); origin fixed effects; and destination fixed effects. 𝑃𝑐 represents crude oil price. 
Model I and II differ from each other by how potential entry threat is measured. Specifically, in 
Model I we use the number of all distinct airlines that are present at both endpoints without serving 
the market, i.e. Threat_all; while in Model II we use the number of all non-legacy carriers that are 
present at both endpoints without serving the market, i.e. Threat_non_legacy. 
In accordance with our theoretical prediction in the model section, we rely on reduced-
form regression analysis to identify the pass-through rate of changes in crude oil price to airfare, 
and examine how market competition, distance and airline-specific decisions on hedging influence 
the size of the pass-through. Based on the linear regression model specifications above, the pass-




= 𝜃1 + 𝜃3𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙    




= 𝜃1 + 𝜃3𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦   
+𝜃7 log(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝜃9𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒     (1.29) 
Equation (28) and equation (29) reveal that the size of the pass-through rate is influenced 
by variables, N_airline_mkt, Threat_all, Threat_non_legacy, log(distance), and Hedge. As such, 
the primary parameters of interest are: 𝜃1, 𝜃3, 𝜃5, 𝜃7 and 𝜃9.  
 
 1.4.2.2 Regression Results 
The reduced-form regression results are reported in Table 1.4. Given the fact that airlines 
jet fuel hedging decisions are airline-specific characteristics that are included in the regressions, 
then airline fixed effects cannot be included in the regressions.  
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We use the logarithm of airfare and crude oil price, thus the coefficient estimate on 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑐) 
measures the elasticity of airfare with respect to crude oil price, i.e. the percentage change in airfare 
associated with a given percentage change in crude oil price. The coefficient estimates of 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑐)  
in both models have the expected positive signs and are statistically significant. Without 
considering the impact of other market characteristics, the coefficient estimates on 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑐) reveal 
that, on average, a 10% increase in crude oil price yields about a 0.61% to 0.77% increase in 
airfare. This result provides direct evidence that a given percentage change in crude oil price 
translates into a certain percentage change in airfare. In particular, we find evidence of a direct 
positive impact of crude oil price shocks on airfares. Our estimate of the pass-through rate is 
similar to the pass-through estimate in Duplantis (2010), 0.08, with constant capacity.  
The coefficient estimates of 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡 are both statistically significant. This 
parameter is introduced to capture the role of actual market competition in influencing the market 
airfare. Both estimates have expected negative signs, suggesting that the more airlines actually 
serving the market (implying higher competition in the market), the lower the airfare. For example, 
the estimated coefficient on 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡 indicates that, on average, each additional carrier 
active in an origin-destination market lowers airfare of a typical product in the market by 3.5% to 
3.7%.  
The coefficient estimates on 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙 and 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦 measure the role of 
potential market competition in influencing the market airfare. The two variables are expected to 
have a negative impact on the airfare rationalized by the fact that a greater number of entry threats 
from potential entrants places downward pressure on the market airfare. The coefficient estimate 
on 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦 has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant, suggesting 
that each additional non-legacy carrier that threatens to enter an origin-destination market lowers 
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the market fare by 2.39% on average. The coefficient estimate for 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙 does not have the 
expected sign and is not statistically significant at the conventional levels of statistical significance.  
In order to assess the role of market competition level in influencing the size of pass-
through from changes in crude oil price to airfare,27 we focus on the interaction terms: 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐) ×
𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐) × 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙 in Model I and 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐) × 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡, 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐) ×
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦 in Model II. The interaction terms of 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐) × 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡 in both 
models are statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance. In Model I, the 
coefficient estimate on 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐) × 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡 suggests that the more airlines competing in an 
origin-destination market, the greater the size of pass-through in that market. Specifically, it 
implies that, on average, each additional air carrier actually serving an origin-destination market 
increases the pass-through elasticity by approximately 0.006 percentage points. The coefficient 
estimate on 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐) × 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙 in Model I is not statistically significant, so we focus on the 
interpretation of the coefficient estimate of 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐) × 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦 in Model II, i.e.  𝜃5̂ =
0.00757. This estimate implies that each additional non-legacy carrier placing an entry threat to 
an origin-destination market raises the pass-through elasticity in the market by around 0.008 
percentage points. In summary, the empirical results validate our theoretical prediction in 
Proposition 3 that greater market competition on average increases the size of pass-through from 
changes in crude oil price to airfare.  
 
 
                                                 




in Model I and II, 𝜃5 =
𝜕𝑃𝑇𝑅
𝜕𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙
 in Model I and 𝜃5 =
𝜕𝑃𝑇𝑅
𝜕𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦
 in Model II.  
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Table 1.4 Reduced-form Airfare Regression Models Estimated by Ordinary Least Squares 
 Model I Model II 
 Dependent Variable: 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 (𝑷) 




















𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒄) × 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕_𝒏𝒐𝒏_𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒄𝒚 (𝜽𝟓) 
 0.00757*** 
(0.00146) 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 (𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆) (𝜽𝟔) 
0.394*** 0.387*** 
(0.0104) (0.0101) 
























𝑹𝟐 0.315 0.315 
𝑵 615242 615242 
𝑷𝑻𝑹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
0.04884a 0.03924b 
-0.03546c -0.04446d 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Year and quarter dummies, origin and destination dummies are included in both Model I and II. 
a 𝑃𝑇𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝜃1̂ + 𝜃3̂ × 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃5̂ × 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜃7̂ × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
b 𝑃𝑇𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝜃1̂ + 𝜃3̂ × 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃5̂ × 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜃7̂ × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
c 𝑃𝑇𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝜃1̂ + 𝜃3̂ × 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃5̂ × 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜃7̂ × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜃9̂ 
d 𝑃𝑇𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝜃1̂ + 𝜃3̂ × 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃5̂ × 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜃7̂ × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝜃9̂ 
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We now consider how market non-stop flight distance affects market airfare by examining 
the coefficient estimates on the logarithm market distance, 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒), in each model. Our 
regression results show that the coefficient estimates are both statistically different from zero with 
positive signs, suggesting that the longer the market distance, the higher the airfare. Specifically, 
a 10% increase in market distance between the origin and destination results in approximately 4% 
increase in equilibrium airfare. 
To examine the extent to which market distance affects the size of pass-through,28 we now 
look at the coefficient estimate on the interaction term between the logarithm of crude oil price 
and the logarithm of market distance: 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐) × 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒). Both coefficient estimates in 
Model I and II are statistically significant with negative signs, indicating that the size of pass-
through declines with longer market distances. For example, everything else constant, a 10% 
increase in an origin-destination market distance reduces the pass-through elasticity by 0.15% to 
0.16%. A 10% increase in market direct flight distance is an increase of approximately 141 miles 
evaluated at the sample mean of market distance. Guided by the theoretical predictions in 
Proposition 4, the negative sign suggests that, on average, the “level effect” dominates the 
“elasticity effect”.  
A change in crude oil price, which in turn changes gasoline price and the relative cost to 
consumers of driving versus flying, is likely to shift air travel demand by a larger amount in shorter 
distance travel as consumers tend to find switching between driving and flying much easier at 
shorter distances. We refer to as a “level effect” in the theoretical analysis, and illustrated in Figure 
1.5, a shift in the level of air travel demand induced by changes in crude oil price and the relative 
                                                 
28 This impact of market distance on pass-through rate is captured by the parameter 𝜃7, i.e. 𝜃7 =
𝜕𝑃𝑇𝑅
𝜕log (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)
 in Model 
I and II. 
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cost to consumers of driving versus flying. For example, an increase in crude oil price which 
increases gasoline price and therefore increases the relative cost of driving versus flying will 
induce a larger increase in air travel demand in short distance markets compared to long distance 
markets. The relatively smaller increase in demand in longer distance markets will cause airfare to 
rise by less in these markets, thus translating into a smaller pass-through of the crude oil price 
increase to airfare in longer haul markets. In other words, the “level effect” implies that the size of 
pass-through of crude oil price changes to airfare is smaller in longer distance markets.  
On the other hand, because demand is likely more elastic in shorter distance markets owing 
again to consumers greater willingness to switch between driving and flying, optimal price-setting 
behavior of airlines predicts that  airlines are less likely to pass along a cost shock to passengers 
through airfare in shorter haul markets, an effect we refer to as an “elasticity effect” in the 
theoretical analysis, which is illustrated in Figure 1.6. The “elasticity effect” implies the size of 
pass-through of crude oil price changes to airfare is larger in longer distance markets since demand 
is less elastic in longer distance markets, which better enables airlines to pass along a cost shock 
to passengers through airfare. Since the empirical results reveal that the size of pass-through 
declines with longer market distances, we conclude that on average the “level effect” dominates 
the “elasticity effect”.  
We now examine the potential role of airlines’ jet fuel hedging decisions in affecting the 
equilibrium airfare and the size of pass-through as a result of changes in crude oil price. We first 
focus on how the 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 dummy variable may affect the market airfare. In both models, we see 
positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates on the 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 dummy variable, 
suggesting that the average airfare is higher for air travel products offered by airlines that purchase 
fuel using hedge contracts. Specifically, airfare for air travel products under fuel hedging contracts, 
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on average is about 43% higher than airfare for air travel products not under fuel hedging contracts. 
Airlines that use hedging contracts to lock in future fuel purchase price benefit from these hedging 
contracts during periods of rising fuel prices, but incur a relative cost from being locked into these 
contracts during periods of declining fuel prices. Figure 1.3 reveals a general decline in fuel prices 
over the time periods of our sample, which may in part explain the higher average airfare of air 
travel products offered by airlines locked into hedge contracts during these periods.  
To evaluate the impact of the jet fuel hedging contracts on the pass-through rate,29 we 
consider the coefficient estimates on the interaction between crude oil price and the hedge dummy 
variable: 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐) × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒. The coefficient estimates in Model I and II are both negative and 
statistically significant at the conventional levels of statistical significance, implying that the 
adoption of jet fuel hedging contracts places downward pressure on the size of pass-through. 
Specifically, the pass-through rate for products under fuel hedging contracts, on average, is 0.084 
percentage points lower than the pass-through rate for products not bounded by hedging contracts. 
This result validates our theoretical prediction in Proposition 2 that fuel hedging provides airlines 
incentive to reduce the intensity of pass-through to airfare when facing a crude oil price shock. 
Airlines that enter jet fuel hedging contracts tend to experience smaller changes in their marginal 
cost from crude oil price shocks compared to airlines that do not use fuel hedging contracts. In this 
case, the latter airlines are more likely to pass along the crude oil price shocks to consumers 
through airfare. However, as airline fixed effects are excluded from both regression specifications, 
we need to be cautious in terms of interpreting the magnitude of the hedging effect. It is possible 
                                                 
29 The jet fuel hedging impact on pass-through rate is measured by the parameter 𝜃9; 𝑃𝑇𝑅 evaluated at 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 = 1 
represents the difference in impact on the pass-through elasticity for products under hedging contracts as opposed to 
products without hedging.  
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that the coefficient estimate on 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 dummy variable may capture features other than hedge 
contracts that are common to all the hedged airlines that differentially influence their cost pass-
through rate.  
We turn next to analyze how the other factors affect the airfare in the model. The coefficient 
estimates on 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 in both models are positive and statistically significant at conventional 
levels of significance. The positive sign implies that each additional intermediate stop that a 
product has increases average airfare by about 8.4%. Products with more intermediate stops imply 
longer itinerary flying miles and higher fuel costs associated with the product, which rationalizes 
the higher airfare for products with more intermediate stops. The same rationale applies to the 
positive coefficient estimates on the 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 variable, a variable that measures flying 
distance of the itinerary routing relative to the non-stop flying distance between the two endpoints 
cities.  
The sign of the coefficient estimates on 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 are both positive and 
statistically different from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. Since this 
coefficient estimate measures airline airport prominence or a “hub premium,” we expect the 
greater the airline presence in an origin airport (thus a larger “hub premium”), the higher the airfare 
charged by the airline.  
Last, to control for the impact of the potential consumer demand on airfare, we introduce 
the geometric mean of the population size in origin and destination cities in the regression. The 
coefficient estimates on the logarithm of 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 are both statistically significant with positive 
signs in Model I and II, suggesting that the larger the market size, the greater the potential demand 
and thus the higher is equilibrium airfare.  
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With the key pass-through parameter estimates in hand, we may assess the overall impact 
of crude oil price shocks on airline market fare by computing the average rate of pass-through. The 
last row of Table 1.4 lists the overall pass-through rates using the parameter estimates 
of  𝜃1̂, 𝜃3̂, 𝜃5̂, 𝜃7̂, 𝜃9̂ from the regressions and variables of 𝑁_𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑚𝑘𝑡, 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙, 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 at their sample mean, and the hedging dummy evaluated at 1. 
Evaluated at the sample mean before considering the hedging effect, the average pass-through rate 
suggests that, on average, a 10% increase in crude oil price will be translated into a 0.4% to 0.5% 
increase in airfare. Taking into account the hedging effect, we find that every 10% increase in 
crude oil price leads to products under hedging being priced relatively lower by approximately 
0.35 to 0.44 percentage points. These results do validate the role of jet fuel hedging in mitigating 
the influence of changes in crude oil price on airfare.  
 
 1.5 Conclusion 
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the market mechanisms through which 
crude oil price may influence airfare, which facilitates identifying the possible market and airline-
specific characteristics that may influence the extent to which crude oil price changes affect airfare. 
We first use a simple theoretical model of air travel demand and Nash equilibrium price-setting 
behavior of airlines to derive clear theoretical predictions that guide proper specification of 
reduced-form regression models, and help with interpreting empirical results from the regression 
models. According to our theoretical model, the pass-through from crude oil price changes to 
changes in airfare is facilitated by demand-side, supply-side, and competitiveness features of 
origin-destination air travel markets. A key demand-side feature is consumers’ willingness to 
substitute between driving and flying, a key supply-side feature is the extent to which an airline’s 
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marginal cost is influenced by changes in fuel price, while a key competitiveness feature is the 
number of airlines providing air travel service in the origin-destination market. 
We find that a 10% increase in crude oil price yields a 0.7% increase in an air travel 
product’s fare before considering market and airline-specific factors that influence the pass-
through rate. This result provides direct empirical evidence that a given percentage change in crude 
oil price translates into a certain percentage change in airfare. Consistent with predictions from 
our theoretical model, we do find evidence that the size of the pass-through of crude oil price 
changes to airfare depends on several market and airline-specific factors.   
First, we find that, on average, each additional carrier actually serving an origin-destination 
market increases the pass-through elasticity of a typical product in the market by approximately 
0.006 percentage points. This is evidence that the size of the pass-through of crude oil price 
changes to airfare depends on the level of market competition, where market competition is 
measured by the number of carriers actually serving the market. Specifically, the evidence suggests 
that the pass-through rate is higher in more competitive markets.  
Second, we find that the size of the pass-through of crude oil price changes to airfare not 
only depends on the level of market competition, but also on the level of potential competition 
faced by market incumbents. Specifically, our regression results suggest that each additional non-
legacy carrier that threatens to enter an origin-destination market raises the pass-through elasticity 
of a typical product in the market by approximately 0.008 percentage points.  
Third, we find that the size of pass-through of crude oil price changes to airfare is smaller 
in longer distance origin-destination markets. For example, everything else constant, a 10% 
increase in an origin-destination market distance reduces the pass-through elasticity of a typical 
product in the market by approximately 0.16%. Our theoretical explanation of this empirical result 
50 
is a dominant “level effect”, which is defined as a shift in the level of air travel demand induced by 
changes in crude oil price and the relative cost to consumers of driving versus flying. For example, 
an increase in crude oil price, which increases gasoline price and therefore increases the relative 
cost of driving versus flying will induce a larger increase in air travel demand in short distance 
markets compared to long distance markets. The relatively smaller increase in demand in longer 
distance markets will cause airfare to rise by less in these markets, thus translating into a smaller 
pass-through of the crude oil price increase to airfare in longer haul markets. 
Fourth, we find that airlines’ adoption of jet fuel hedging contracts reduces the size of pass-
through of crude oil price changes to airfare. Specifically, the pass-through rate for products under 
fuel hedging contracts, on average, is 0.084 percentage points lower than the pass-through rate for 
products not bounded by hedging contracts. As shown in our theoretical analysis, hedging 
contracts effectively reduce the extent to which an airline’s marginal cost is influenced by changes 
in fuel price, which in turn mitigates the influence of fuel price changes on changes in airfare. 
A key contribution of this paper is that it provides concrete empirical estimates of the size 
of pass-through from changes in crude oil price to U.S. domestic air travel market fare, which has 
not been well studied in the literature. Furthermore, our empirical analysis is built on a theoretical 
framework that considers both demand and supply side market channels through which changes 
in crude oil price may be passed through to airfare and onto consumers. To the best of our 
knowledge, such an analysis of market mechanisms has not been studied by any previous literature 
that focused on the cost-price pass-through in the airline industry. Relying on a reduced-form 
regression analysis, however, we are unable to empirically disentangle various demand side and 
supply side effects on the size of pass-through. As such, future research may want to consider 
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using a structural econometric model designed to empirically unpack the reduced-form evidence 
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Chapter 2 - How Much Do Consumers Value Single-cup Coffee 
Brew Technology? Assessing Market Impacts of Single-cup Brew 
Technology on the U.S. Brew-at-home Coffee Market 
 2.1 Introduction 
New product introduction, which often incorporates new and improved technology, has 
long played a critical role in influencing not only consumers’ tastes and welfare but also firms’ 
profitability and even the overall market structure. According to industry analysts, the single-cup 
coffee brewing technology has been considered the most-disruptive development in the business 
since Starbucks Corp began the coffee-shop boom in the late 1980s30 and even the biggest thing 
since Luigi Bezzera patented the espresso machine in 1901.31 K-Cup technology, a single-cup 
coffee brewing technology pioneered by the American firm Keurig, quickly gained popularity 
since the late 2000s, driving widespread adoption of the single-cup brewing systems in the United 
States (US) brew-at-home coffee market.32 Adoption of the single-cup brewing systems in the US 
brew-at-home coffee market accelerated further in 2012 when K-Cup patent expired. The rapid 
rise of single-cup technology fueled sales of single-cup coffee pods. US consumers bought $3.1 
billion worth of coffee pods in year 2013 versus $132 million in year 2008.33 There is little doubt 
that the introduction of single-cup coffee technology, with a single-serve brewing machine and a 
                                                 
30 https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/may/14/the-first-starbucks-coffee-shop-seattle-a-history-of-cities-in-50-
buildings-day-36  
31 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Espresso_machine  
32 In fact, during the time period when Keurig single-serve systems were widely accepted by the US household, there 




portion-packed coffee pod, has not only changed the way many brew-at-home coffee drinkers brew 
and consume coffee in daily life, i.e. a change from brewing one “pot” at a time to making one cup 
at a time, but also altered the overall landscape of the US brew-at-home coffee market.   
The key objective of this paper is to examine impacts in the US brew-at-home coffee 
market associated with the introduction and growing presence of single-cup coffee brewing 
technology. Specifically, we are interested in measuring changes in prices, consumer demand, firm 
profitability and overall consumer welfare associated with the introduction and growing presence 
of single-cup coffee brewing technology. 
According to data from Information Resources Inc. (IRI) and Statista, the share of single-
cup coffee pods sales among all brewing method coffee types at the retail level rose tremendously 
from 1.73% in 2008 to 36.5% in 2016, whereas the share of traditional auto-drip brew ground 
coffee sales experienced a significant decline from over 65% in 2008 to 45.8% in 2016 (See Figure 
2.134). What’s more, a survey conducted by National Coffee Association (NCA) in 2016 reveals 
that 28% of the US population reported drinking coffee prepared with single-cup coffee pods in 
2016, an increase from 19% in 2012 and 7% in 2011;35 whereas, in 2016, 50% of the population 
reported drinking coffee prepared using the traditional auto-drip brewing method, a decline from 
70% of the population in 2011, and 61% of the population in 2012 (See Figure 2.2). The fast 
growth of single-cup coffee sales makes the single-cup technology the second most popular 
brewing method after the traditional auto-drip technology, far surpassing instant coffee, espresso 
machines, and all other methods of brewing coffee. 
                                                 
34 The category of “Others” includes instant (decaf) coffee, whole bean (decaf) coffee and other coffee substitutes.  
35 The increasing penetration of single-cup coffee consumption in the US households from 2011 to 2012 partially can 
be explained by the Keurig’s K-Cup patent expiration in 2012, leading to an explosion of competitors into the single-
cup pods market. (http://time.com/2913062/k-cups-war/) 
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Figure 2.1 Coffee Retail Sales Share, by Coffee Type 
Source: IRI data for 2008 to 2012. Statista.com for 2016. 
Figure 2.2 Coffee Preparation Methods Used by the U.S. Households, by Coffee Type 
 
Source: NCA survey (2016) 
 
The analysis in this paper is twofold.  First, we examine how much consumers value their 
coffee consumption experience using the single-cup brewing technology relative to the traditional 
auto-drip brewing method.  Indeed, the paper is motivated by the fact that single-cup brew coffee 
consumption was soaring since 2012 and substantially cannibalizing the sales of traditional auto-
drip brew coffee products.  To accomplish the objective of the first part of the analysis we adopt a 
random coefficients logit demand model [Berry (1994); Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995); Nevo 
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(2000a, b, 2001); Petrin (2002) etc.] to obtain estimates of consumers’ dollar value willingness to 
pay (WTP) for the single-cup technology brewing method coffee consumption experience relative 
to their consumption experience from using traditional auto-drip ground coffee brewing method.  
The second part of the analysis is designed to better understand the economic impacts of 
the single-cup technology brewing method on consumer coffee demand, firm profitability, and 
consumer welfare.  To obtain estimates of firm profitability we specify an oligopoly model based 
on an assumed strategic price-setting behavior of firms.  Specifically, we assume that coffee 
manufactures set coffee product prices according to a static Nash equilibrium price-setting game.  
We accomplish the objectives of this part of the analysis by using the estimated coffee demand 
model along with the specified oligopoly model to perform a counterfactual experiment.  The 
counterfactual experiment asks how equilibrium market outcomes of interest (prices, consumer 
demand, firm profits, and consumer welfare) are predicted to change if consumers equally value 
the single-cup technology brewing coffee consumption experience and the traditional auto-drip 
brewing coffee consumption experience.  
Our findings suggest that, on average, a typical coffee drinker is willing to pay up to ¢2.52 
extra per equivalent fl oz to consume brewed coffee from the single-cup brewing method and 
thereby avoid using the traditional auto-drip brewing method. Everything else equal, this WTP 
estimate implies that, on average, a coffee drinker is willing to pay a price per equivalent fl oz that 
is 2.57 times the average price per equivalent fl oz of traditional auto-drip brewed coffee products 
just to enjoy the attribute of single-cup brewing technology as part of the consumption experience 
instead of the attribute of traditional auto-drip brewing method. Furthermore, our demand model 
estimates suggest that this relative consumer willingness to pay gap increases with consumer 
income level, that is, higher income consumers tend to have greater marginal utilities from 
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consuming coffee with the single-cup brewing technology. Our estimated model reveals that the 
counterfactual removal of consumer preference for coffee consumption experience with the single-
cup brewing technology is predicted to result in an increase in consumer demand for traditional 
auto-drip brew coffee products and a significant decrease in consumer demand for single-cup brew 
coffee products. Specifically, such counterfactual preference change is predicted to result in 
demand for traditional auto-drip brew coffee products at levels that are on average 3.88% greater 
than the actual demand levels for these products; whereas consumer demand for single-cup brew 
coffee products decreased by 98.5%. The counterfactual preference change is predicted to result 
in a typical consumer benefiting from the introduction and growing presence of single-cup brew 
technology by having a mean increase in individual consumer surplus of 2% from the initial level.  
On the supply side, our model estimates suggest that a typical auto-drip brew coffee 
product has considerably greater margin (price markup over marginal cost as a percent of price) 
of 55%, compared to the margin of a typical single-cup brew product of 13.6%; whereas the 
marginal cost for a typical single-cup brew coffee product is about 5 times greater than that of a 
typical auto-drip brew coffee product. These estimates suggest that single-cup brew coffee 
products, at least at the early stage of their product life cycle in 2012, are very costly to produce at 
the margin with relatively small price-cost margins. The counterfactual experiment provides 
evidence that a typical auto-drip brew ground coffee product in a market is predicted to experience 
an increase in its variable profit by 4.6% during a month. This predicted impact on variable profit 
of auto-drip brew coffee products suggests cannibalizing effects associated with the introduction, 
and growing penetration, of single-cup brewing technology products on traditional auto-drip brew 
ground coffee products.  In other words, a traditional auto-drip ground coffee product could have 
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had a much greater demand and profitability if consumers did not have a relatively higher 
preference for new single-cup brewing technology products.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature.  Section 
3 discusses data sources and variables used in the analysis. Section 4 describes the empirical 
model, as well as the estimation method. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. 
Section 6 describes the counterfactual procedure and analyzes findings from the counterfactual 
experiment.  Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
 2.2 Related Literature 
Previous studies have paid particular attention to traditional auto-drip ground coffee and/or 
instant coffee categories.  A number of studies focus on the response of traditional auto-drip ground 
coffee prices to input cost shocks (e.g. changes in raw coffee bean price or exchange rates) [Leibtag 
et al. (2007); Nakamura and Zerom (2010); Bonnet et al. (2013); and Bonnet and Villas-Boas 
(2016)].  These papers investigate factors that contribute to incomplete pass-through of cost shocks 
to prices in the coffee market for the traditional auto-drip ground coffee category.36  Nakamura 
and Zerom (2010), for example, estimates long-run cost pass-through rates within a dynamic 
structural framework using retail and wholesale level price data in the US coffee market.  Some 
studies, such as Draganska and Klapper (2007), Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2008), 
Villas-Boas (2007b), and Villas-Boas (2009), focus on vertical relationships between coffee 
manufacturers and retailers in the traditional auto-drip ground coffee market segment. Villas-Boas 
(2007b), for example, assesses welfare effects of mergers at the coffee manufacturer level under 
                                                 
36 Leibtag et al. (2007) and Nakamura and Zerom (2010) study the ground coffee price-cost pass-through in the US 
and the other two papers focus on the German ground coffee market.  
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various assumptions of the vertical structure using retail level scanner data for the traditional auto-
drip ground coffee category in Germany. Among studies that focus on vertical relationships 
between firms in the coffee industry, Noton and Elberg (2016) model bargaining power between 
coffee manufacturers and retailers in the traditional auto-drip ground and instant coffee categories 
in Chile.  
However, there are only a few research papers studying the single-cup brew coffee 
category. Chintagunta et al. (2018) study the Portugal coffee market and develop a structural model 
of demand and supply for the coffee system of single-serve coffee machines and pods as tied-
goods. The paper examines the impact of licensing decisions of manufacturers on pricing and 
profits of firms in the system. Kong et al. (2016) also focuses on coffee brewing machines and 
pods as tied goods. Their study proposes a static demand system of Keurig single-cup brewing 
machines and K-Cups partnered with some national coffee brands that are well-known in the 
mature ground coffee segment, such as Starbucks, Folgers, Maxwell House, etc. The paper 
performs counterfactual exercises that illustrate the role of partnering and licensing K-Cups with 
national brands in driving the growth of the overall Keurig single-serve coffee system. Lin (2017) 
is another similar work that studies the network effect of third-party brands’ partnering with K-
Cups on the adoption of Keurig brewing systems (the platform) in a two-sided market framework 
using individual household purchase data.  Last, Ellickson et al. (2017) uses a structural model of 
demand and supply-side bargaining to examine how retailers and manufacturers behave in the 
absence of private label branded single-serve coffee pods before Keurig patent expired in 2012, 
and how their strategies adapt when entry occurs after patent expiration in the US single-cup coffee 
sector.  
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The above papers focus their empirical analyses uniquely on the single-serve coffee 
system.  Our study, instead, is interested in understanding the potential impact of the growing 
penetration of single-cup coffee products on traditional auto-drip ground coffee products. 
Specifically, this paper aims to assess how much consumers value the current quickly growing 
single-cup market segment relative to the traditional auto-drip ground coffee market segment, and 
the extent to which key market outcomes of traditional auto-drip ground coffee products, such as 
demand, prices, and profitability, are impacted by the growing presence of single-cup coffee 
products. Our research objectives and methodology are related to the literature estimating the 
economic effects of newly introduced products or technology.  
Researchers have studied extensively the economic effects of new products in various 
industries. A few well-known papers in this literature include Hausman (1996), Hausman and 
Leonard (2002), Petrin (2002), and Goolsbee and Petrin (2004).37 The often used research 
methodology in this literature is to first estimate demand in the presence of the new product, and 
then use the estimated model to simulate changes in equilibrium market outcomes driven by the 
counterfactual absence of the new product from consumers’ choice set.  For example, Petrin (2002) 
measures the welfare effects of the minivan introduction in the 1980s and finds that consumers 
overall benefit from the new product introduction. Even though we perform an alternative 
counterfactual experiment, our research methodology has similarities to the methodology in Petrin 
(2002). Instead of assessing changes in market outcomes driven by the counterfactual removal of 
the new product from consumers’ choice set as done in Petrin (2002), we assess changes in market 
                                                 
37 Hausman (1996) studies the effect of Apple Cinnamon Cheerios. Hausman and Leonard (2002) looks at the effect 
of Kimberly-Clark bath tissue product ‘Kleenex Bath Tissue’. Petrin (2002) focuses on the effect of minivans and 
Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) on the effect of direct broadcast satellites.  
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outcomes driven by a counterfactual change in consumers’ preference for new products relative to 
other products in the market.  In doing so in our setting, we effectively evaluate the economic 
effects of changes in consumers’ preference for the coffee brewing technology.  To the best of our 
knowledge, this present paper is the first to evaluate the economic importance of consumers’ 
valuation of single-cup coffee brewing technology, and the first to assess the extent to which 
traditional auto-drip ground coffee product sales and profitability are influenced by the 
introduction and growing presence of single-cup coffee products.  
 
 2.3 Data 
The primary data used in our empirical analysis are retail-level scanner data on consumer 
purchases of traditional auto-drip ground coffee products and single-cup brewing technology 
coffee products. These scanner data are sourced from the Information Resources Inc. (IRI) 
academic database [Bronnenberg et al. (2008)], which spans 1795 supermarkets across 50 IRI 
defined geographical areas in the continental United States. In this study, markets are defined by 
unique combinations of time periods and IRI defined geographical areas. The IRI defined 
geographical areas span almost the entire continental US. The data include weekly coffee product 
unit sales, revenue from these unit sales, and various characteristics of the coffee products. We use 
data in year 2012.38 Detailed information for each weekly observation includes: total dollars 
received by retailers; unit sales of coffee packages; net weight of dry coffee (in ounces) contained 
in each package, and a set of product attributes. The following product attributes are used to 
                                                 
38 Data on single-cup brewing technology coffee products are available from 2008 to 2012.  A reason why 2012 is a 
good year for the analysis we do is that it is the year when single-cup coffee products become the second most popular 
coffee category according to the 2016 NCA survey.  It is thus an important transition year in which the single-cup 
coffee category started growing quickly in the US. 
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characterize a product in the present study: coffee type;39 coffee form;40 organic information;41 
caffeine content;42 brewing method;43 packaging material information;44 package size 
information;45 and promotional information46. A product within a market in this study is defined 
as a unique combination of the retail store where it is sold, the brand name, and all the non-price 
product attributes listed above. Folgers and Maxwell House are two distinct manufacturers of auto-
                                                 
39 We focus only on two coffee categories: traditional auto-drip technology ground coffee products; and single-cup 
brewing technology coffee products.  All other categories are characterized into “others” including: instant; whole 
bean; ground decaffeinated; instant decaffeinated; and other coffee substitutes.  As you will observe later once we 
have described the demand model, the “others” category constitutes the “outside” option for consumer choice.  
40 Coffee forms for regular ground coffee include regular grind and fine grind; single-cup coffee products include K-
Cups that are trademarked by Keurig, other cups that are compatible with single-serve brewing systems other than 
Keurig, and single pods that are wrapped with filter papers. (http://www.coffeeteawarehouse.com/coffee-k-cup-vs-
pod.html)  
41 All observations due to coding error are removed. Observations with missing organic information are supplemented 
with information provided by online sources (if they are able to be identified from online resources). All other un-
identified observations from any available resources are eliminated.  
42 Caffeine content is approximated using information from USDA National Nutrient Database for Standard Reference 
Release 27, “Basic Report 14209, Coffee, brewed from grounds, prepared with tap water”.  On average, 0.61 gram of 
ground coffee contains 40 mg caffeine, equivalently, 1.86 gram caffeine per ounce of dry coffee.  
43 Brewing methods for all ground coffee are using auto-drip coffee makers, but for single-cup products are either 
Keurig brewing systems or other one-cup systems such as Nespresso and Tassimo etc. (Euromonitor International). 
44 Product packages for ground coffee including laminated bags (e.g. foil bags or film bags), paper bags/boxes, plastic 
containers, and light metal tins. (https://plastics.americanchemistry.com/LCI-Summary-for-8-Coffee-Packaging-
Systems/) 
45 The package size sometimes refers to the net weight of dry coffee grounds contained in a package. It is difficult to 
use this information when defining a product as this measure has nearly continuous values across all records in the 
data. Some records have small decimal differences in this measure. For example, two auto-drip coffee products owned 
by CHOCK FULL O NUTS sold in January-Boston market are in 10.3008 oz package and 10.5008 oz package, 
respectively; and all other product attributes of these two products are the same. Therefore, following the large package 
definition in Guadagni and Little (1998) and Ansari, Bawa, and Ghosh (1995), we categorize the packages sizes into 
two discrete categories: Large or Small. Large packages contain dry coffee grounds greater than 16 oz, while small 
packages contain up to 16 oz of dry coffee grounds.  
46 These data contain information related to promotional activities such as feature, display, and temporary price cut.  
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drip coffee products and single-cup coffee products. An example of an auto-drip coffee product 
sold in the January-Atlanta market, where January identifies the specific month during year 2012, 
and Atlanta identifies the relevant geographic area, is: Folgers’ auto-drip, regular ground, non-
organic, caffeine content of 0.93 gram of caffeine per ounce of dry coffee, packed in large bulk 
size in a plastic canister (29.2 oz), sold without any promotions in the retail store that have ID 
number “242546”. Similarly, an example of a single-cup coffee product sold in the same January-
Atlanta market is: Maxwell House’s single-cup coffee, non-organic, caffeine content of 1.86 gram 
of caffeine per ounce of dry coffee, packed in individual single cups with 16 cups in the laminated 
bag (4.45 oz), sold without any promotions in the retail store that have ID number “242546”. These 
weekly observations are aggregated to monthly data based on defined products and markets. The 
monthly aggregation reduces the 10 million weekly observations to 1.4 million monthly 
observations. With 12 months and 50 IRI defined geographic areas, we have 600 markets in total.  
 
 2.3.1 Construction of Price and Quantity Variables  
To prepare the dataset for the empirical analysis, we create the price and quantity variables 
for defined products. To analyze consumer taste variation across single-cup brew and traditional 
auto-drip brew ground coffee products, we need a comparable quantity measure. Previous 
literature studying the coffee market focus on traditional auto-drip brew ground coffee and/or 
instant coffee products, and the measure of coffee demand/consumption is universally in terms of 
mass weight of dry coffee grounds in ounces47 [Villas-Boas (2007a, 2007b), Leibtag et al. (2007), 
                                                 
47 There are several exceptions that focus on the single-cup coffee market.  For example, Ellickson et al. (2017) adopt 
a similar conversion method as in our paper. Chintagunta et al. (2018) focus uniquely on single-cup coffee, thus the 
price variable measures the per pod price.  
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Nakamura and Zerom (2010), Bonnet et al. (2013), Bonnet and Villas-Boas (2016)]. However, the 
demand for single-cup brew coffee pods, given their distinct brewing method from the traditional 
auto-drip ground coffee, cannot be simply measured by the mass weight of dry coffee grounds 
contained in coffee pods.  
In order to construct prices that are comparable across the two coffee segments, we first 
define an equivalent serving size for each segment, namely, the mass weight of coffee grounds in 
ounces (oz) to make a standard cup of brewed coffee, 10 fluid ounces (fl oz). This standard cup 
size is a product of the NCA survey in 2016.48 For single-cup coffee products in our data, an 
individual coffee pod contains coffee grounds of 0.3 – 0.4 oz varying by brands, with an average 
of 0.35 oz in a typical coffee pod. We assume each pod makes a standard cup of 10 fl oz of freshly 
brewed coffee regardless of how much coffee grounds each pod contains. For traditional auto-drip 
brew coffee products, we apply a universal serving size of 0.317 oz coffee grounds per standard 
10 fl oz cup of coffee.49 Given these assumptions, we convert the product quantity measured in 
ounces of dry coffee grounds in the original IRI data to equivalent fluid ounce measure across 
traditional auto-drip brew coffee products and single-cup brew coffee products. Therefore, 
consumer quantity demanded is measured by how much fluid ounces of brewed coffee can be 
potentially made from each product given the product’s equivalent serving size.  
                                                 
48 This survey also reports that the average number of cups drank per-day per capita is 1.98.  This implies a coffee 
drinker consumes 594 fl oz per month, on average.  
49 The coffee-to-water ratio suggested by NCA is one to two tablespoons of ground coffee for every six fluid ounces 
of water. (http://www.ncausa.org/About-Coffee/How-to-Brew-Coffee) The two largest ground coffee brands, Folgers 
and Maxwell House, both suggest a recipe of one tablespoon ground coffee (about 0.19 ounces) per six fluid ounces 
of water for regular strength, and two tablespoon ground coffee (about 0.38 ounces) per six fluid ounces of water for 
strong coffee. (https://www.folgerscoffee.com/coffee-how-to/how-to-measure-coffee) We consider an average coffee 
drinker follows a regular strength brewed coffee recipe, i.e. 0.0317 oz ground coffee makes 1 fl oz brewed coffee. 
Using this ratio, we then compute the total fluid ounces for each ground coffee product. 
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For each weekly observation in the data, we have information on total dollars received by 
the retailer for multiple packages sold during a week, the number of packages as well as the net 
weight (in ounces) of coffee grounds in a package. Before collapsing the weekly data to monthly, 
we compute the total quantity sold in equivalent fluid ounces for each weekly observation of 
single-cup brew products by multiplying the number of pods in a package with the number of 
packages sold in a week and then multiply by the standard cup size of 10 fl oz. For traditional auto-
drip brew coffee products, we first compute the total ounces of ground coffee sold in each week 
by multiplying the net weight of coffee grounds in a package with the number of packages sold in 
a week. Assuming a typical consumer utilizes a typical coffee-water ratio of “0.317 oz/10 fl oz” to 
make a “pot” of brewed ground coffee, we compute the total quantity sold in equivalent fluid 
ounces in a week by dividing the total ounces of coffee grounds sold by this ratio. We then 
calculate the weekly average price for each weekly product observation using the ratio of total 
dollars from sales to total equivalent fluid ounces sold in a week. When collapsing the data to 
monthly frequency, the “price” variable for a product is the mean of those weekly average prices 
for a product sold during a month, and the “quantity” variable for a product is the sum of total 
equivalent fluid ounces sold in a month.  
 Within the framework of a discrete choice demand model, to calculate the market share of 
each product in a market that allows for outside goods option, one needs a measure of potential 
market size that is larger than the actual aggregate consumption of products in the market.  
Potential market size (later denoted 𝑀𝑡) is computed as the total equivalent fluid ounces of brewed 
coffee that could be consumed in a market during a month if all adult males and females in the 
market consumed coffee at the typical per capita consumption rates for males and females 
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respectively.50  The observed product share (later denoted 𝑆𝑗𝑡) is computed by dividing the quantity 
sold of a product in equivalent fluid ounces by the above defined potential market size, while the 
share of the outside goods option, denoted as 𝑆0𝑡, is computed as 𝑆0𝑡 = 1 − ∑ 𝑆𝑗𝑡𝑗𝜖𝐽 , where J 
represents the set of coffee products in market t of our data. The outside good share is a measure 
of the proportion of the potential market size who did not consume any of the J coffee products in 
market t. 
The summary statistics of price, quantity, and market size are presented in Table 2.1. In 
the collapsed dataset, a given market, on average, contains 2,324 products, and the data contain 
600 markets according to our product and market definitions. There are 1,394,455 observations in 
the data. These coffee products sold in year 2012 have an average coffee price of ¢2.93 per 
equivalent fl oz, with a mean monthly quantity sold in a market of 10,982 equivalent fl oz. The 
table also reveals that coffee products that require using the single-cup brewing technology are on 
average more expensive than traditional auto-drip brew coffee products. In particular, mean 
product price among single-cup brewing technology coffee products is ¢6.40 per equivalent fl oz, 
while mean product price among traditional auto-drip brewing method coffee products is ¢1.61 
per equivalent fl oz. Last, the measure of potential market sizes described above yields a mean of 
product shares equal to 8.82E-06.  
 
                                                 
50 Based on the NCA survey, we calculate the total equivalent fluid ounces of brewed coffee consumed by a female 
and a male per month respectively.  On average, a female drinks 1.85 cups per day and a male drinks 2.11 cups per 
day, with each standard cup being 10 fl oz.  The female and male adult populations in a market are obtained from the 
American Community Survey estimates in 2012. 
(https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_DP05&src=pt) 
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 2.3.2 Other Variables 
Other variables that characterize product attributes are reported in Table 2.1. To evaluate 
consumer preference for the coffee brewing technology consumption experience, we include a 
coffee type dummy variable, Single-cup Brew. Dummy variable, Single-cup Brew, equals to 1 if a 
coffee product is designed to use the single-cup brewing technology, and 0 if the product is 
designed to use the traditional auto-drip brewing technology. On average, 27.5% of products in 
our data set are single-cup brew coffee products, while the other products in our data set are 
traditional auto-drip brew coffee products.  
Consumers normally show varying tastes between organic and non-organic food and 
beverage items. To capture the potential impact that the organic feature of coffee products has on 
consumer demand, we consider a dummy variable, Organic, equal to 1 if a product is organic 
coffee and 0 otherwise. As Table 2.1 reveals, most coffee products in the data sample are non-
organic. 
Many studies analyze the extent to which marketing strategies used by retailers, such as 
whether the product is featured in the retail store, specially displayed in the retail store, and/or 
have a temporary retail price cut, affect consumer brand choice and brand loyalty [Hwang and 
Thomadsen (2017), Bronnenberg et al. (2012) and Boatwright, Dhar and Rossi (2004)].  To capture 
the potential impact of retailer marketing activities on consumer demand, we construct a variable, 
Deal_cnt, which counts the number of weeks in a month that a product is on feature, display, or 
has a temporary price cut. The summary statistics in Table 2.1 shows that on average, the typical 
product is promoted 0.84 weeks within a month.51 We expect a positive effect of promotional 
activities on consumer demand. 
                                                 
51 Coffee is one of the most frequently promoted consumer packaged goods (CPGs) (Boatwright et al. (2004)). 
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Price ($/fl oz across all coffee product types) 0.029 0.024 9.04E-06 0.179 
Price ($/fl oz across traditional auto-drip brew coffee products) 0.016 0.007 9.04E-06 0.114 
Price ($/fl oz across single-cup brew coffee products) 0.064 0.019 0.000082 0.179 
Quantity (fl oz) 10982 31226 39.42 2510784 
Single-cup Brew dummy (Single-cup brew coffee products = 1) 0.275 0.447 0 1 
Organic dummy (organic coffee products = 1) 0.063 0.243 0 1 
Deal_cnt (No. of weeks per month a product was promoted) 0.846 1.154 0 5 
Caffeine (gram per ounce) 1.685 0.477 0 2.23 
Large package dummy (>16 ounces in a package=1) 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Product market shares (all inside goods)  8.82E-06 0.00009 4.60E-09 0.035 
Market shares of outside goods 0.982 0.014 0.738 0.997 
No. of defined products in a market  2324 1945.15 193 12045 
No. of defined markets 600 
IRI geographical areas 50 
No. of retailers 1,795 
No. of manufacturers 240 
No. of brands 317 
No. of observations 1,394,455 
* All prices are adjusted to 2012 dollars.     
 
The caffeine content for a typical product is 1.68 grams per ounce with a minimum of 0 for 
a decaffeinated coffee product. Caffeine is a major pharmacologically active compound in coffee 
beans, and it is a mild central nervous system stimulant [de Mejia and Ramirez-Mares (2014)].  
Coffee, like other caffeinated soft drinks, acts as a stimulant beverage. As such, we expect a 
positive impact of caffeine content on consumer demand.  
Last, we consider the demand impact of package size, which is captured by dummy 
variable, Large, equal to 1 if a product has a net weight of coffee grounds in a package greater than 
the standard package size of 16 oz [Guadagni and Little (1998); and Ansari, Bawa, and Ghosh 
(1995)], 0 otherwise. The demand model coefficient estimate on dummy variable, Large, is 
expected to be positive according to the similar estimate in previous literature. 
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There are 240 coffee manufacturers and 317 brands in the data sample. It will be too large 
of a table to report summary statistics by all coffee manufacturers. Therefore, for the data reported 
in Table 2.2, we select ten coffee manufacturers that have the largest shares of total revenue during 
the sample period. In the table, we also include a firm that is the only firm in the data that solely 
produces single-cup coffee, TREEHOUSE FOODS INC. Table 2.2 presents summary revenue 
information of eleven firms. We distinguish the type of firms based on whether a firm produces 
both traditional auto-drip brew coffee products and single-cup brew coffee products or only one 
of the two coffee categories. Among these firms, there are six, defined as multi-coffee-type-
product firms, that produce both traditional auto-drip brew coffee products and single-cup brew 
pods. The largest multi-coffee-type-product firm is THE JM SMUCKER CO, with the largest total 
coffee revenue share of 30.58% during 2012. This firm also has the largest dollar sales of auto-
drip brew coffee products, accounting for 34.02% of total dollar sales of all auto-drip brew coffee 
products across all firms during the sample period. KEURIG GREEN MOUNTAIN is the second 
largest multi-coffee-type-product firm in terms of total coffee dollar sales, with 19.02% total coffee 
sales and the largest single-cup brew coffee producer, with single-cup pods dollar sales of 71.55% 






Table 2.2 A Sample of Coffee Manufacturers with Annual Revenue Share > 1% in 2012 
 
All Products  
Auto-drip Brew Coffee 
Products 
 Single-cup Brew Coffee 
Products 






THE J M SMUCKER CO 72,700,000 30.58%  60,900,000 34.02%  11,800,000 20.10% 
KEURIG GREEN MOUNTAIN 45,200,000 19.02%  3,139,717 1.75%  42,000,000 71.55% 
KRAFT FOODS GROUP INC 34,800,000 14.64%  33,700,000 18.83%  1,046,781 1.78% 
PRIVATE LABEL 24,100,000 10.14%  22,400,000 12.51%  1,668,879 2.84% 
STARBUCKS COFFEE CO 19,700,000 8.29%  19,600,000 10.95%  80,215 0.14% 








8,022,678 3.38%  8,022,678 4.48%    
JOH A BENCKISER (JAB) 6,867,266 2.89%  6,867,266 3.84%    
TATA TEA LTD 4,719,001 1.99%  4,719,001 2.64%    
F GAVINA & SONS INC 2,438,692 1.03%  2,438,692 1.36%    
TREEHOUSE FOODS INC 336,113 0.14%     336,113 0.57% 





 2.4 The Model 
In this section, we outline the analytical framework used to perform the empirical analysis.  
The analytical framework is to estimate structural parameters that govern US domestic brew-at-
home coffee markets demand and supply, and then use the estimated structural parameters to 
simulate new market equilibrium outcomes based on specific assumed counterfactual changes.  
The counterfactual change we analyze is to assume that consumers are indifferent between coffee 
consumption with the single-cup brewing technology and with the traditional auto-drip brewing 
technology. 
Our empirical procedure contains two steps. First, we specify and estimate a random 
coefficients logit demand model that allows consumers’ heterogeneous preferences to affect coffee 
demand [see, e.g., McFadden (1984), Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Nevo 
(2000a, b, 2001), Petrin (2002) and many others].  Particularly, we follow the method described 
in Nevo (2000a) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) that uses market-level price and quantity 
data for each product in a series of markets to estimate the demand model, taking into account that 
product prices are likely correlated with shocks to demand embodied in the demand error term.  
Compared to standard logit and nested logit demand models, the random coefficients logit model 
allows for considerable flexibility in the specification of heterogeneous consumer preferences and 
potentially yield consumer substitution patterns across products that are difficult, and sometimes 
impossible, to obtain from the standard logit or nested logit models. Of particular interest are 
estimates of demand parameters that capture consumers’ relative taste preference for their coffee 
consumption experience with the single-cup brewing technology compared to their coffee 
consumption experience with the traditional auto-drip brewing technology.  
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The second step of the empirical procedure requires specification of an oligopolistic model 
of competition between firms that supply coffee products. The oligopolistic model we use assumes 
coffee firms set coffee product prices according to a static Nash equilibrium price-setting game.  
Optimal price-setting behavior of firms in the oligopoly model implies a set of equations that 
depend on demand parameter estimates and allows us to compute product-level markups and 
recover estimates of product-level marginal costs. With the product-level marginal costs in hand 
along with demand parameter estimates, we again use the optimal price-setting behavioral 
equations implied by the oligopoly model to perform a counterfactual experiment. The 
counterfactual experiment asks how equilibrium market outcomes of interest (prices, consumer 
demand, firm profits, and consumer welfare) are predicted to change if consumers equally value 
the single-cup technology brewing coffee consumption experience and the traditional auto-drip 
brewing coffee consumption experience. Operationalizing the counterfactual experiment simply 
requires us setting to zero estimates of demand parameters that capture consumers’ relative taste 
preference for their coffee consumption experience with the single-cup brewing technology 
compared to their coffee consumption experience with the traditional auto-drip brewing 
technology.  Since these demand parameters are embedded into the optimizing equations implied 
by the oligopoly model, we simply use these equations to facilitate computation of new 
counterfactual market equilibrium outcomes of interest.    
 
 2.4.1 Demand 
We model consumers’ coffee product choices with a random utility discrete choice model.  
Suppose there are T distinct markets for coffee products, and markets are indexed by 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇.  
Each market is populated with 𝐼𝑡 potential coffee consumers, and consumers are indexed by  𝑖 =
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1, … , 𝐼𝑡. Consumers in each market are faced with 𝐽𝑡 distinct coffee product choices, in addition to 
the alternative of not to purchase one of the 𝐽𝑡 distinct coffee products in our data sample. 
Therefore, in each market consumers are effectively faced with 𝐽𝑡 + 1 alternatives, which are 
indexed by 𝑗 = 0,… , 𝐽𝑡, where 𝑗 = 0 represents consumers’ outside option of not purchasing one 
of the coffee products in our data sample.  In our analysis, consumers’ outside option is a composite 
of several possibilities such as buying other coffee substitutes (e.g. instant coffee, whole bean 
coffee, ready-to-drink coffee beverages, etc.) or simply not buying.  
The conditional indirect utility consumer 𝑖 obtains from choosing product 𝑗 in market 𝑡 is: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝛽𝑖 + 𝜙𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 − 𝐶𝑢𝑝 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑎𝑠 + 𝑎𝑏 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡        (2.1) 
where 𝑥𝑗𝑡 is a vector of 𝐾 observed product characteristics that vary across products and 
markets; and 𝛽𝑖 is a 𝐾 + 1 vector of consumer-specific taste parameters i.e., marginal utilities, 
associated with the corresponding product characteristic variables in 𝑥𝑗𝑡. 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 − 𝐶𝑢𝑝 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑗𝑡 is 
a zero-one dummy variable that equals to one only if consumption of coffee product j in market t 
requires using single-cup brewing technology; and 𝜙𝑖 is the associated consumer-specific taste 
parameter. Since consumption of the coffee products in our data sample either requires using 
traditional auto-drip brewing technology, or using single-cup brewing technology, this implies that 
parameter 𝜙𝑖 measures consumer 𝑖′𝑠 preference for the single-cup brewing technology 
consumption experience compared to the traditional auto-drip brewing technology consumption 
experience. 𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the price of product 𝑗 in market 𝑡, assumed common to all consumers; and 𝛼𝑖 is 
the consumer-specific taste parameter that measures the consumer’s marginal utility of price. 𝑎𝑡 
captures market-specific shocks to consumers’ preferences for coffee products; 𝑎𝑠 captures retail 
store-specific shocks to consumers’ preferences for coffee products; and 𝑎𝑏 captures brand-
specific differences in consumers’ preferences for coffee products. In estimation, we control for 
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fixed effects captured by 𝑎𝑡, 𝑎𝑠, and 𝑎𝑏 using relevant zero-one dummy variables. Finally, 𝜉𝑗𝑡 is a 
composite of product characteristics that are observed by consumers and firms, but unobserved by 
us the researchers; and 𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a mean-zero stochastic error term.   









) + Γ𝐷𝑖 + Σ𝑣𝑖,     𝑣𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝐼𝐾+3)   (2.2) 
where 𝐷𝑖 is a 𝑚 × 1 vector of observed consumer demographic variables with mean of 
zero and variance of one across all markets; and Γ is a (𝐾 + 3) ×𝑚 matrix of parameters that 
measures how consumers’ taste for attributes of coffee products vary by observed demographics.  
In the actual demand estimation, we include income in 𝐷𝑖 in the form of deviation from its market 
mean, to allow an individual’s marginal utility of specific product attributes to vary with his or her 
income level. Unobserved shocks to consumers’ taste for various product attributes are contained 
in 𝑣𝑖, which is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. Σ is a diagonal matrix, where the 
elements on the main diagonal are parameters which measure variation in taste across consumers 





), measures the mean of the random coefficients.   
Based on equations (1) and (2) above, the conditional indirect utility consumer 𝑖 obtains 
from the purchase of product 𝑗 in market 𝑡 can be re-written as: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡(𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 − 𝐶𝑢𝑝 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑗𝑡, 𝑝𝑗𝑡, 𝑎𝑡, 𝑎𝑠, 𝑎𝑏 , 𝜉𝑗𝑡; 𝛽, 𝜙, 𝛼)    
+𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 − 𝐶𝑢𝑝 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑗𝑡, 𝑝𝑗𝑡, 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖; Γ, Σ) + 𝑖𝑗𝑡    (2.3) 
where 𝛿𝑗𝑡 = 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝜙𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 − 𝐶𝑢𝑝 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑎𝑠 + 𝑎𝑏 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 is the mean 
utility (across consumers) obtained from consuming product 𝑗; and 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = [ 𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 −
78 
𝐶𝑢𝑝 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑗𝑡, 𝑝𝑗𝑡](Γ𝐷𝑖 + Σ𝑣𝑖) is a consumer-specific deviation from the mean utility level. The 
outside option, denoted good 0, yields mean utility that is normalized to be zero.  For 
computational tractability, the idiosyncratic error term 𝑖𝑗𝑡 is assumed to be governed by an 
independent and identically distributed extreme value density. 52 The probability that product 𝑗 is 
chosen, or equivalently the predicted (by the model) market share of product 𝑗 is therefore: 






𝑑𝐹(𝐷)̂ 𝑑𝐹(𝑣)  (2.4) 
where 𝐹(𝐷)̂ and 𝐹(𝑣) are population distribution functions for consumer demographics 
and random taste shocks assumed to be independently distributed. As is well-known in the 
empirical industrial organization literature, there is no closed-form solution for the integral in 
equation (4), and thus it must be approximated numerically using random draws from 𝐹(𝐷)̂ and 
𝐹(𝑣).53 
Finally, the demand for product 𝑗 is given by:  
𝑑𝑗𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡 × 𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝑝𝑗𝑡 , 𝜉𝑗𝑡; 𝛽, 𝜙, 𝛼, Γ, Σ)    (2.5) 
where 𝑀𝑡 is a measure of the potential size of market t; 𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝑝𝑗𝑡, 𝜉𝑗𝑡; 𝛽, 𝜙, 𝛼, Γ, Σ) is the 
predicted product share function from equation (4); and (𝛽, 𝜙, 𝛼, Γ, Σ) is the set of demand 
parameters to be estimated. The potential market size measure 𝑀𝑡, as previously described, is the 
total equivalent fluid ounces of brewed coffee that could be consumed in a market during a month 
if all adult males and females in the market consumed coffee at the typical per capita consumption 
rates for males and females respectively. 
                                                 
52 For notational convenience, from this point onwards we let 𝑥𝑗𝑡  represents all the measured non-price product 
characteristics in our data, including variable, 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 − 𝑐𝑢𝑝 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑗𝑡. 
53 In the actual demand estimation, we use 200 random draws from 𝐹(∙) for the numerical approximation of 𝑠𝑗𝑡(∙). 
79 
 2.4.2 Supply 
The supply side of our structural econometric model can be designed to capture both the 
horizontal and vertical relationships between coffee manufacturers and retailers [Bonnet and 
Dubois (2010); Bonnet et.al. (2013); and Bonnet and Villas-Boas (2016)]. However, in this paper, 
it is not our focus to explore which supply model best represents the vertical structure of the US 
coffee industry. Instead, we make the simplifying assumption that retailers do not play a strategic 
role in setting retail prices of the coffee products in our analysis, and simply set retail prices just 
high enough to cover their economic retailing costs and costs to obtain coffee products from coffee 
manufacturers. We do assume coffee manufacturers play a strategic role in setting prices of their 
coffee products to non-cooperatively maximize firm-level profit. As such, we consider a supply 
model of the coffee industry in which coffee manufacturers effectively determine coffee product 
prices according to a static Nash equilibrium price-setting game.  
Suppose each coffee manufacturer 𝑓 offers a set of coffee products in market 𝑡, 𝐹𝑓𝑡, and 





∑ (𝑝𝑗𝑡 −𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑡)𝑞𝑗𝑡𝑗∈𝐹𝑓𝑡      
= max
𝑝𝑗𝑡∀𝑗∈𝐹𝑓𝑡
∑ (𝑝𝑗𝑡 −𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑡) × 𝑀𝑡 × 𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝒑)𝑗∈𝐹𝑓𝑡   (2.6) 
where in equilibrium the quantity of coffee product 𝑗 that gets sold in market 𝑡, 𝑞𝑗𝑡, is 
exactly equal to the market demand of this product, i.e. 𝑞𝑗𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡 × 𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝒑). Recall that 𝑀𝑡 is a 
measure of potential market size; 𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝒑) is the predicted market share function for product 𝑗; and 
𝒑 is a vector of the prices for the 𝐽 products in market 𝑡. Last, 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑡 represents the marginal cost 
incurred by the firm to provide product 𝑗 in market 𝑡. 
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The first-order conditions generated from the optimization problem in equation (6) for all 
competing firms are a set of 𝐽 equations, one for each product. Following expositions in Nevo 
(2000a), the set of 𝐽 first-order conditions imply the following product markup equation expressed 
in matrix notation: 
𝒑 −𝒎𝒄 = −(𝛀 ∗ 𝚫)−𝟏 × 𝒔(𝒑)    (2.7) 
where 𝒔(∙), 𝒑,𝒎𝒄 are 𝐽 × 1 vectors of product shares, prices, and marginal costs, 
respectively; 𝛀 is a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones based on the 
manufacturers’ ownership structure of the 𝐽 products; 𝚫 is a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix of first-order derivatives 
of predicted product shares with respect to prices; and 𝛀 ∗ 𝚫 is an element-by-element 
multiplication of the two matrices.  
Equation (7) above implies product-level markup estimates, i.e. 
𝒎𝒌𝒖𝒑(𝒙, 𝒑, 𝝃; ?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, Γ̂, Σ̂) = −(𝛀 ∗ 𝚫)−𝟏 × 𝒔(𝒑), which depend exclusively on the demand-side 
variables and parameter estimates. Using computed product-level markups and product prices, 
product-level marginal cost estimates can be recovered as follows: 
𝒎?̂? = 𝒑 − [−(𝛀 ∗ 𝚫)−𝟏𝒔(𝒑)]    (2.8) 
Last, with the estimated markups given by equation (7), manufacturers’ variable profits 
can be computed using: 
𝑉𝑃𝑗𝑡̂ = ∑ 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑡(𝒙, 𝒑, 𝝃; ?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, Γ̂, Σ̂)𝑗∈𝐹𝑓𝑡 ×𝑀𝑡 × 𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝒙, 𝒑, 𝝃; ?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, Γ̂, Σ̂) (2.9) 
 
 2.4.3 Estimation and Identification of Demand 
To estimate the set of demand parameters, we use generalized method of moments (GMM) 
following the previous literature [Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Nevo (2000a) 
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and Petrin (2002)]. The general strategy is to derive parameter estimates such that the observed 
product shares 𝑆𝑗𝑡 are equal to the predicted product shares 𝑠𝑗𝑡.
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Instruments 
The classic econometric problem in logit demand estimation is the endogeneity of prices. 
Obtaining consistent demand parameter estimates relies heavily on the selection of instrument 
variables for the endogenous product prices. Consumers make purchase decisions among different 
coffee products, where a product is perceived as a bundle of product attributes. Product attributes 
unobserved by researchers, which are contained in 𝜉𝑗𝑡,  are likely correlated with prices. Hence, it 
is important to select appropriate instrument variables for prices. One way to cope with the 
endogeneity of prices is to account for fixed differences in 𝜉𝑗𝑡 in a flexible manner by introducing 
dummy variables [Nevo (2001)]. These dummies control for constant differences in consumer 
utility across products as well as regional differences in the mean utility of products. As such, to 
help mitigate the endogeneity problem we include in the mean utility function time dummies, store 
dummies, brand dummies, and geographic region dummies (i.e. IRI geographical areas) to account 
for some product characteristics in 𝜉𝑗𝑡.  
To further mitigate the endogeneity problem, we construct instruments for products prices 
using direct components of marginal cost interacted with brand fixed effects as in Villas-Boas 
(2007a, 2007b) and Nakamura and Zerom (2010). Firms set coffee product prices by taking into 
                                                 










𝑖  , where 𝑛𝑠 is the number of random draws from the distribution of 𝐷 and 𝑣; 𝑛𝑠 = 200 
in the actual demand estimation. The 200 individual draws are obtained from Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 
datasets. 
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account exogenous cost-side variables, such as coffee bean prices, energy prices, and exchange 
rates. Due to the exogeneity of these input markets from the perspective of coffee markets, it is 
likely that these input prices are uncorrelated with shocks to coffee demand contained in 𝜉𝑗𝑡. For 
example, a firm’s changes how coffee products are displayed in a store, which likely influence 
demand and prices for its products due to such changes being captured in 𝜉𝑗𝑡, are unlikely to be 
correlated with exchange rate changes between Brazil and the U.S. However, exchange rate 
changes between Brazil and US are likely to influence the prices of several coffee products.    
When estimating demand, we include three types of instruments for prices. The first is 
time-varying exchange rates between Brazilian real and US dollar interacted with brand 
dummies.55 Raw coffee beans, like any other exchange-traded commodities, are traded in 
commodity exchange markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Changes in 
exchange rates often impact raw coffee bean trade flows and trading prices. The largest raw coffee 
bean exporting country is Brazil, which is also the main source of coffee bean imports for the US 
coffee industry in 2012, according to International Coffee Organization (ICO).56 Therefore, 
changes in exchange rates between Brazil real and US dollar are likely important in explaining 
variations in coffee products’ production costs. By using the interactions between exchange rates 
and brand dummies as instrument variables, we allow exchange rates to influence coffee products’ 
production costs differently across brands. As in Nakamura and Zerom (2010), we consider lagged 
exchange rates to capture the potential lagged response in coffee products’ production costs and 
its transmission to influence coffee product prices.  
                                                 
55 Exchange rate between Brazil and US is obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
(https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXBZUS)  
56 Global coffee trade statistics can be found at the ICO website: http://www.ico.org/new_historical.asp  
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For the second set of instruments, we interact the national average electricity prices57 with 
the dummy variables for four different packaging materials for coffee products. The packaging 
materials are: (1) paper bags/boxes; (2) laminated (foil) bags; (3) plastic canisters; and (4) light 
metal tins. By interacting electricity price with zero-one dummy variables that correspond to the 
four different packaging materials, we allow these four instrument variables to capture the 
likelihood that changes in electricity prices affect coffee products’ production costs differently 
across different packaging processes. Furthermore, in principle this set of instruments is valid since 
changes in electricity price are unlikely to be driven by changes in coffee markets, making this set 
of instruments exogenous to coffee markets.   
Last, we include the mean of Deal_cnt across all products for each coffee producer as an 
additional instrument for product price. The first-order conditions associated with firms’ optimal 
choice of prices to maximize their variable profit reveal that a product’s equilibrium price is a 
function of markup and marginal cost. As such, a change in a product’s markup is likely to affect 
its price. The idea is that the average markup that a producer is able to charge is related to the 
characteristics of its products.  
 
 2.5 Empirical Results 
 2.5.1 Demand  
The demand model estimates can be found in Table 2.3. The first column reports parameter 
estimates from the standard logit model using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator without 
                                                 




instrumenting for price; the second column reports standard logit model parameter estimates where 
we have instrumented for prices using the set of instrument variables discussed in the previous 
section. Parameter estimates from the random coefficients logit demand model are reported in the 
last three columns. In the last three columns of estimates, consumer heterogeneity is considered 
by allowing the coefficient on coffee product price and other product characteristics to vary across 
individual consumers.  
Comparing OLS estimates, which are obtained without using instruments for price, with 
the other columns of estimates (two-stage least squares (2SLS) and generalized method of 
moments (GMM)) when price instruments are used, one notices that the coefficient estimate for 
price increases in absolute value with instrumentation. As stated in the model section, price is an 
endogenous variable that is likely correlated with product attributes in 𝜉𝑗𝑡 since these product 
attributes are observed by decision-making consumers and firms, even though they are not 
observed by us the researchers. The Wu-Hausman endogeneity test statistics of 33392.11 confirms 
the endogeneity of price by rejecting the exogeneity of price at 1% level. It suggests that the OLS 
estimation produces biased and inconsistent estimates of the price coefficient. Moreover, the weak 
instrument test using Stock and Yogo’s (2005) test yields a test statistic of 112.22, which is 
statistically significant at 1% level, and thus rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments used 
for price are weak. We focus the remainder of our analysis on demand estimates obtained from the 
random coefficients model.  
Among the last three columns, the first column of estimates reports means of the 
distribution of marginal utilities (𝛽′𝑠). The second column of estimates labeled “Standard 
Deviations” measures taste variation of select product attributes driven by unobserved consumer 
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characteristics, 𝑣𝑖. The last column of estimates represents the effect of consumer income on 
consumers’ marginal utilities of select product attributes.  
We find the mean coefficient estimate for price is negative and statistically significant at 
1% level, indicating coffee price, on average, has a negative impact on consumers’ mean utility. 
All else equal, an increase in a product’s price reduces the probability that a typical coffee drinker 
chooses the product. The coefficient estimate on the interaction between price and consumer 
income level is statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance. The 
positive coefficient estimate suggests an intuitively appealing result that higher income consumers 
tend to be less price sensitive. The parameter estimate that measures the variation of price 
sensitivity across consumers, which is located in the column labeled “Standard Deviations”, is 
statistically significant, providing evidence that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their 






Table 2.3 Demand Estimates 
 Standard Logit Model (𝝁𝒊𝒋 = 𝟎)  Random Coefficients Model (𝝁𝒊𝒋 ≠ 𝟎) 
 (1) OLS  (2) 2SLS  (3) GMM 
Variables 
Mean Coef  
(𝛼, 𝛽′𝑠) 
 Mean Coef 
(𝛼, 𝛽′𝑠) 







Price ($/fl oz) -14.236***  -146.975***  -163.61*** -11.8986*** 10.8184*** 
 (0.117)  (1.021)  (2.663) (0.312) (2.068) 
Constant -14.776***  -7.637***  -34.0554*** 9.0402***  
 (0.337)  (0.470)  (0.870) (1.795)  
Single-cup Brew -0.709***  4.297***  4.0616*** -0.044 1.9357*** 
 (0.006)  (0.039)  (0.124) (0.177) (0.152) 
Organic -0.9696***  -0.510***  -0.4861***   
 (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.017)   
Deal_cnt 0.153***  0.015***  0.0051*   
 (0.0008)  (0.0016)  (0.003)   
Caffeine 0.613***  0.652***  0.6624***   
 (0.002)  (0.0031)  (0.006)   
Large 0.858***  0.450***  0.3757***   
 (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.012)   
Time Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
IRI Market Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Store Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Brand Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-sq 0.615       
Wu-Hausman (Chi-sq)   33392.1***     
Stock and Yogo Weak 
Instrument Test (F) 
  112.22***     
     GMM Objective 0.0329 
No. of Observations 1,394,455  1,394,455  1,394,455 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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To assess how much consumers value their coffee consumption experience using the 
single-cup brewing technology relative to the traditional auto-drip brewing method, we focus on 
the parameter estimates for the dummy variable, Single-cup Brew.  The mean coefficient estimate, 
4.0616, is positive and significant at 1%, providing evidence that the average consumer obtains 
more utility from the coffee consumption experience that uses single-cup brewing technology 
compared to the coffee consumption experience that uses auto-drip brewing method. In other 
words, a cup of freshly brewed coffee using the single-cup brewing technology is associated with 
higher levels of consumer satisfaction relative to levels of satisfaction associated with coffee 
consumption using the traditional auto-drip brewed method of ground coffee.  
The parameter estimate that measures variation across consumers of utility differences 
obtained from the single-cup brewing technology consumption experience relative to traditional 
auto-drip brewing method consumption experience, which is located in the column labeled 
“Standard Deviations”, is not statistically significant, suggesting that taste heterogeneity for the 
brewing method product attribute is mostly explained by the included demographics.58  We find 
evidence that an important driver of consumers’ heterogeneity with respect to their preference for 
the single-cup brewing technology consumption experience relative to traditional auto-drip 
brewing method consumption experience is their level of income. In particular, the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient estimate for the interaction between the Single-cup Brew 
dummy variable and consumer income, 1.9357, suggests that higher income consumers have a 
greater gain of utility from the coffee consumption experience using single-cup brewing 
technology compared to the coffee consumption experience that uses auto-drip brewing method.  
                                                 
58 Nevo (2000a) provides detailed discussions about the interpretation of the estimates of the standard deviations for 
the random coefficients.  
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In other words, evidence from the demand estimation suggests that, relative to lower income 
consumers, higher income consumers obtain an even greater satisfaction from the single-cup 
brewing technology consumption experience compared to their satisfaction obtained from 
traditional auto-drip brewing method consumption experience.  Perhaps this finding is in part due 
to higher income households being better able to afford more expensive single-serve coffee 
brewing systems, which often cost $100 to $200 compared with an average price of $35 for many 
auto-drip coffee makers.59 
The structural demand model allows us to obtain estimates of consumers’ willingness to 
pay (WTP) for various measured product attributes.  For example, the average WTP for the coffee 
consumption experience which uses single-cup brewing technology is given by the mean of the 
200 individuals’ marginal utility coefficient estimates on dummy variable, Single-cup Brew, ( 𝜙?̂?) 
divided by their respective marginal utility coefficient estimate on price ( 𝛼?̂?) across all markets. 
The resulting mean WTP estimate is ¢2.52 per equivalent fl oz,60 indicating that a typical coffee 
drinker is willing to pay up to ¢2.52 extra per equivalent fl oz to consume brewed coffee from the 
single-cup brewing method and thereby avoid using the traditional auto-drip brewing method.  
This is equivalently saying a typical coffee drinker is willing to pay ¢25 extra per standard 10 fl 
oz cup of brewed coffee using the single-cup technology rather than the traditional auto-drip 
method.  We now better contextualize this WTP estimate of ¢2.52 per equivalent fl oz for the 
single-cup brewing method attribute.  
From the previously discussed summary statistics in Table 2.1, we saw that the mean price 
across traditional auto-drip brewed coffee products in our sample is ¢1.61 per equivalent fl oz, 
                                                 
59 http://time.com/money/3733586/k-cups-price-cost-comparison-coffee/  
60 We convert the dollar value to cents for illustration.  
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while the mean price across single-cup brewed coffee products in our sample is ¢6.40 per 
equivalent fl oz.  In other words, in terms of price per equivalent fl oz, the data reveals that, on 
average, single-cup brewed coffee products are 3.98 times as expensive as traditional auto-drip 
brewed coffee products.  However, not all of this price difference is attributable to the difference 
in consumers’ valuation of the single-cup brewing technology consumption experience versus the 
traditional auto-drip brewing technology consumption experience since the products across the 
two sets of product types may differ along several non-price product attribute dimensions.  As we 
reported above, relevant parameter estimates from our demand model reveal that consumers are 
willing to pay ¢2.52 extra per equivalent fl oz just for the single-cup brewing technology 
consumption experience instead of the traditional auto-drip brewing method consumption 
experience.  Assuming all other product attributes are equivalent to the average of said attributes 
for traditional auto-drip brewing method products, our WTP estimate also implies that, on average, 
a coffee drinker is willing to pay a price per equivalent fl oz that is 2.57 times the average price 
per equivalent fl oz of traditional auto-drip brewed coffee products just to enjoy the attribute of 
single-cup brewing technology as part of the consumption experience instead of the attribute of 
traditional auto-drip brewing method.           
To present a picture of the relationship between individual-specific income level and the 
estimates of their marginal willingness to pay for the single-cup brewing technology product 
attribute, we plot the 200 individuals’ annual income (in $100,000) and their respective estimates 
of willingness to pay (in cents/fluid ounce) from two select markets.  These plots are shown in 
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4. It is clear that higher (lower) income individuals are willing to pay more 
(less) to have brewed coffee made from the single-cup coffee machines instead of the traditional 
auto-drip coffee makers. Similar results are found in other markets.  
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Figure 2.3 Individual Income and WTP in Select Market 1 
 
 




We now turn to discuss estimates for other product characteristics that affect consumer 
choice. For an average coffee drinker, organic coffee produces a negative marginal utility, 
suggesting that organic coffee products are less favorable than non-organic coffee during the 
sample period. This is an unexpected estimated demand impact of the organic attribute of coffee 
products.  The other demand shifters all have expected demand impacts and are consistent with 
findings in previous studies.  For example, the variable capturing the extent of promotional 
activities a product received during a month, Deal_cnt, has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient estimate, suggesting that firms’ promotional activities for a given coffee product serve 
to increase consumers’ demand for the product.  This finding is consistent with similar estimates 
in some previous work such as Guadadni and Little (1998), Gupta (1988), Lattin and Bucklin 
(1989), Grover and Srinivasan (1992), Boatwright, Dhar and Rossi (2004), Ansari, Bawa and 
Ghosh (1995).  These studies all provide empirical evidence that promotional activities have a 
positive impact on coffee demand.  Gupta (1988), for example, argues that promotion enhances a 
brand’s value, which in turn enhances the probability of products of this brand being selected by 
consumers.  
The coefficient estimate associated with the caffeine content variable is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that, holding all other coffee demand factors constant, 
consumers prefer coffee products that have higher caffeine content.  A similar result is found in 
Bonnet and Villas-Boas (2016).  The authors find consumers have significant and negative 
preference for caffeine-free products; thereby, a typical coffee drinker prefers coffee products that 
are not decaffeinated. 
The coefficient estimate associated with the zero-one dummy package size variable, Large, 
is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that coffee products that are presented to 
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consumers in large packages (greater than 16 oz) have a higher demand relative to coffee products 
in smaller size packaging.  This result is similar to findings in Guadagni and Little (1998) and 
Ansari, Bawa, and Ghosh (1995). Prendergast and Marr (1997) argue that larger packaged 
consumer goods normally reflect better value to average consumers, and consumers tend to choose 
larger packaged products as they are more likely to stand out on the shelf.  
We use our demand model estimates to compute both own- and cross-price demand 
elasticities for products in the data sample.  We then compute the mean of own-price demand 
elasticities at the coffee manufacturer level and report estimates of eleven select firms in Table 
2.4.  Mean cross-price demand elasticity estimates within and across the two coffee product types 
are reported in Table 2.5.  
 
Own-price Elasticity of Demand Estimates 
In Table 2.4, we report the average own-price elasticities for the eleven select coffee 
manufacturers broken down by coffee types.  The last row in the table shows average own-price 
elasticities across all firms in the sample.  Our demand model yields an average own-price 
elasticity of -4.57 across all products in the sample; an average own-price elasticity of -2.63 across 
all traditional auto-drip brewing method coffee products; and an average own-price elasticity of -
9.69 across all single-cup brewing technology coffee products.  The own-price elasticity estimate 
suggests that a 1% reduction in the price of a traditional auto-drip brew coffee product will, on 
average, result in a 2.63% increase in the quantity demanded for that product, while a 1% reduction 
in the price of a single-cup brew coffee product will, on average, result in a 9.69% increase in the 
quantity demanded for that product.   
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The own-price elasticity of traditional auto-drip brewing method coffee products in 
absolute magnitude, 2.63, is slightly smaller than analogous estimates obtained in previous studies: 
Krishnamurthi and Raj (1991) (own-price elasticity estimates ranging from 3.6 to 8.2); Broda and 
Weinstein (2006) (own-price elasticity estimate of 3.1); Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) 
(own-price elasticity estimate of 3.65); Villas-Boas (2007b) (own-price elasticity estimates 
ranging from 5.6 to 6.8); and Nakamura and Zerom (2010) (own-price elasticity estimate of 3.96). 
We find Chintagunta et al. (2018) is the only work that provides an own-price elasticity estimate 
for single-cup brew coffee products in coffee markets in Portugal, with an estimate of 3.6 in 
absolute magnitude, which is smaller than our mean own-price elasticity estimate for single-cup 
brew coffee products in US markets.  
The average own-price elasticity estimates reveal that consumer demand for single-cup 
coffee products is more sensitive to price changes of these products compared to the sensitivity of 
consumer demand for traditional auto-drip coffee products to price changes of these products.  The 
difference in price sensitivity of consumer demand across these two coffee product types may in 
part be driven by consumers’ broad perception of these two types of coffee products.  Specifically, 
we previously discussed the result produced by our demand model suggesting that, relative to 
lower income consumers, higher income consumers have a greater preference for single-cup 
brewing technology coffee products compared to traditional auto-drip coffee products.  This result 
further suggests that in classifying coffee products along a spectrum ranging from necessities to 
luxuries, single-cup brewing technology coffee products are likely to be closer to luxuries on the 
spectrum compared to traditional auto-drip coffee products. It is a well-established principle in 
microeconomics that luxury products tend to have higher elasticities of demand compared to 
necessity products.  As such, where the two types of coffee products lie on the product 
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classification spectrum ranging from necessities to luxuries in part may explain why single-cup 
brewing technology coffee products have a higher own-price elasticity of demand compared to 
traditional auto-drip brew coffee products. 
 Among the eleven coffee manufacturers, consumers are most price sensitive to products 
of KEURIG GREEN MOUNTAIN (with an estimate of -10.029) and least price sensitive to 
PRIVATE LABEL products (with an estimate of -2.618).  Among traditional auto-drip brewing 
method coffee products, products of JOH A BENCKISER (JAB) have the most elastic demand (-
3.952) while among single-cup brewing technology products, products of STARBUCKS COFFEE 
CO have the most elastic demand (-11.78).  
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Table 2.4 Break-down of Own-price Elasticities, by Coffee Type, Select Coffee Manufacturers with Share of Total Coffee $ 
Sales > 1% in 2012 
  
All Products  
Auto-drip Brew 
Coffee Products 
 Single-cup Brew 
Coffee Products 




THE J M SMUCKER CO -3.880 0.0050  -2.507 0.0018  -8.410 0.0098 
KEURIG GREEN MOUNTAIN -10.029 0.0057  -3.811 0.0046  -10.700 0.0045 
KRAFT FOODS GROUP INC -2.896 0.0057  -2.136 0.0019  -8.641 0.0277 
PRIVATE LABEL -2.618 0.0044  -2.115 0.0024  -5.959 0.0160 
STARBUCKS COFFEE CO -3.676 0.0047  -3.512 0.0022  -11.780 0.0471 




MASSIMO ZANETTI BEVERAGE USA    -1.939 0.0022    
JOH A BENCKISER (JAB)    -3.952 0.0032    
TATA TEA LTD     -2.508 0.0029    
F GAVINA & SONS INC     -2.579 0.0042     
TREEHOUSE FOODS INC             -7.620 0.0280 
Mean Elasticities across all products in the sample -4.570 0.0031   -2.626 0.0011   -9.692 0.0048 
 
Table 2.5 Mean Cross-price Elasticities, by Coffee Type 
i                   
              j 
Single-cup Brew Coffee 
Products 
 Auto-drip Brew Coffee 
Products 
Single-cup Brew Coffee 
Products 
0.00118  0.0007 
(3.23e-06)   (1.11e-06) 
Auto-drip Brew Coffee 
Products 
0.0005  0.00085 
(4.11e-07)   (7.50e-07) 
For cell entries i, j, where i indexes row and j column, given the percent change in market share of product i with 
a 1% change in price of product j. Each entry represents the mean of the elasticities from the 600 markets. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
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Cross-price Elasticity of Demand Estimates 
Cross-price elasticity of demand estimates in Table 2.5 are relatively small in magnitude, 
but all estimates are positive and statistically different from zero, suggesting that consumers do 
perceive the coffee products in our sample as substitutable both within and across the two product 
types.  It is also notable that the mean cross-elasticity estimates reveal the following intuitively 
appealing result: Coffee product pairs within any one of the two coffee product types, on average, 
have larger cross-elasticities (intra-product-type cross-elasticities) and therefore more 
substitutable compared to cross-elasticities among product pairs where products in the pair are in 
different product types (inter-product-type cross-elasticities), i.e., intra-product-type cross-
elasticities are on average larger than inter-product-type cross-elasticities. Specifically, we see that 
among single-cup coffee products the mean cross-elasticity estimate is 0.00118, and among auto-
drip coffee products the mean cross-elasticity estimate is 0.00085.  These cross-elasticity estimates 
suggest that a 1% increase in the price of a single-cup coffee product, on average, results in a 
0.00118% increase in the demand of another single-cup coffee product, while a 1% increase in the 
price of an auto-drip coffee product, on average, results in a 0.00085% increase in the demand of 
another auto-drip coffee product.  However, mean cross-elasticity estimates between single-cup 
coffee products and auto-drip coffee products are 0.0007 and 0.0005, which are smaller in 
magnitude than the within product type mean cross-elasticity estimates.  These mean cross-product 
type cross-elasticity estimates suggest that a 1% increase in the price of a single-cup coffee 
product, on average, results in a 0.0005% increase in the demand for an auto-drip product, while 
a 1% increase in the price of an auto-drip coffee product, on average, results in a 0.0007% increase 
in the demand for a single-cup product.              
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 2.5.2 Markups and Marginal Costs 
We report in Table 2.6 summary statistics of prices, price-cost margins, and marginal costs 
broken down by coffee types.61  There is a total of 1,010,947 traditional auto-drip brewing method 
coffee products and 383,508 single-cup brewing technology coffee products in the sample.  As 
previously reported in Table 2.1, and now again in Table 2.6, the average price per equivalent fluid 
ounce of single-cup brew coffee products is ¢6.4/fl oz, whereas the average price per equivalent 
fluid ounce of traditional auto-drip brew coffee products is only ¢1.6/ fl oz.  The price difference 
suggests that, on average, it is more expensive for consumers to enjoy a cup of freshly brewed 
coffee using the single-cup brewing technology.  In fact, using Keurig K-Cups to make brewed 
coffee may cost consumers up to 5 times more than brewing coffee from a pot using the traditional 
auto-drip method.62 
Table 2.6 Summary Statistics of Price, Markup, and Marginal Cost, by Coffee Type 
 Traditional Auto-drip Brew Coffee Products 
 Price  Markup  Marginal Cost 
Statistics ¢/fl oz  ¢/ fl oz % of Price  ¢/fl oz 
Mean 1.609  0.719 55.36  0.890 
Median 1.509  0.692 46.87  0.792 
10% 0.850  0.612 26.81  0.103 
90% 2.461  0.850 87.96  1.761 
Std. Dev. 0.673  0.137 285.79  0.706 
No. of observations 1,010,947 
 
 Single-cup Brew Coffee Products 
 Price  Markup  Marginal Cost 
Statistics ¢/fl oz  ¢/fl oz % of Price  ¢/fl oz 
Mean 6.399  0.763 13.64  5.636 
Median 6.573  0.711 11.23  5.827 
10% 3.296  0.630 8.07  2.522 
90% 8.316  0.920 23.49  7.608 
Std. Dev. 1.911  0.217 14.82  1.935 
No. of observations 383,508 
                                                 
61 The model generates 3% of observations that have negative marginal cost estimate.  
62 https://www.businessinsider.com/keurig-cups-are-expensive-2015-3 
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Markups measured in cents per equivalent fluid ounce are positive for all products in the 
sample.  A typical single-cup brew coffee product has a markup estimate of ¢0.76/fl oz, which is 
similar in magnitude to the average markup of a typical auto-drip brew coffee product of ¢0.72/fl 
oz. Consequently, with prices being very different across the two product types, the model predicts 
a considerably greater price-cost markup as a percent of price (price-cost margin or Lerner index) 
for a typical auto-drip coffee product, 55.4%, than that for a typical single-cup product, 13.6%.  
The table shows that only 10% of single-cup products have markups greater than 23.5%.  The 
median price-cost margin among auto-drip coffee products in our data is 46.9%, which is close in 
magnitude to what others have found in the literature: Nakamura and Zerom (2010), 36.8%; Villas-
Boas (2007b), 40.4%; and Bonnet and Villas-Boas (2016), 38.67%.  
Finally, subtracting estimated markup from the observed price for each product yields 
implied marginal cost.  Summary statistics on implied marginal cost estimates are reported in the 
last column of Table 2.6.  Auto-drip brew coffee products are estimated to have mean marginal 
cost of ¢0.89/fl oz, whereas single-cup coffee products are estimated to have mean marginal cost 
of ¢5.6/fl oz, suggesting that single-cup pods production is more costly at the margin.  Product-
level marginal cost in the context of our analysis is the cost to the coffee manufacturer of producing 
the equivalent serving size in ounces of coffee grounds that makes one fluid ounce of brewed 
coffee.  Single-cup coffee products are individually portion-packed ground coffee pods packed in 
either bags or cans; whereas traditional auto-drip brew coffee products are simply ground coffee 
packed in bulk either in bags or cans.  This difference in how ground coffee is packaged across 
these two coffee product types may in part explain the difference in marginal costs across the 
product types.  
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 2.6 Counterfactual Analysis 
Using the estimated product-level marginal costs, estimated structural parameters, and 
first-order condition equations resulting from Nash price-setting behavior of firms, we simulate 
the resulting market equilibrium from imposing the counterfactual assumption that consumers are 
indifferent between coffee consumption that uses single-cup brewing technology and coffee 
consumption that uses traditional auto-drip brewing method. Imposing the counterfactual 
assumption that consumers are indifferent between the two types of brewing methods is achieved 
by setting to zero coefficient estimates associated dummy variable, Single-cup Brew, in the utility 
function, i.e., based on demand parameter estimates reported in Table 2.3, we would set 4.0616, -
0.044 and 1.9357 to 0.  The counterfactual experiment is performed to investigate how equilibrium 
market outcomes of interests (prices, consumer demand, firm profits and consumer welfare) are 
predicted to change if consumers equally value the single-cup brewing technology coffee 
consumption experience and the traditional auto-drip brewing method consumption experience.  
The new equilibrium price vector, 𝒑∗, is obtained by numerically searching for the vector 
of prices that satisfy the following equation: 
𝒑∗ = 𝒎?̂? − [𝛀 ∗ 𝚫(𝒑∗)]−𝟏𝒔(𝒑∗)    (2.10) 
where 𝒎?̂? is the vector of recovered product-level marginal cost estimates based on all 
demand parameter estimates in Table 2.3.  However, the demand parameter estimates used for 
constructing matrix 𝚫(𝒑∗) and vector 𝒔(𝒑∗) are the estimates in Table 2.3, with the exception that 
all coefficient estimates associated with the dummy variable, Single-cup Brew, in the utility 
function are set equal to zero.  A comparison of the actual observed price vector 𝒑 from the data 
with the model predicted new equilibrium price vector 𝒑∗ reveals how equilibrium price would be 
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affected if consumers’ preference for the single-cup brewing technology coffee consumption 
experience were to be removed.  
We next discuss how the new equilibrium price vector 𝒑∗ is used to recover other 
equilibrium market outcomes of interest.  The discussion begins with predicted changes in coffee 
demand and firm variable profits, and then turn to the analysis of predicted changes in equilibrium 
product prices and markups.  We leave for last, discussing predicted changes in consumer welfare. 
 
 2.6.1 Predicted Changes in Coffee Demand, Markup, and Variable Profits 
We use the following equations to compute counterfactual coffee demand and 
manufacturers’ variable profits respectively: 
𝒒∗ = 𝑀 × 𝒔(𝒑∗; ?̂?, ?̂? = 0, ?̂?, Γ̂, Σ̂)    (2.11) 
𝑉𝑃𝑓
∗̂ = ∑ (𝑝𝑗
∗ −𝑚𝑐?̂?) × 𝑞𝑗
∗
𝑗∈𝐹𝑓       (2.12) 
where 𝒒∗ is a vector of counterfactual product demand levels measured in equivalent fluid 
ounces; and 𝒑∗ is the previously obtained vector of counterfactual equilibrium prices predicted by 
the model. A comparison of the actual demand 𝒒 with the counterfactual demand 𝒒∗ reveals how 
much consumer coffee demand would be affected assuming coffee drinkers are indifferent 
between the two brewing methods.  𝑉𝑃𝑓
∗̂  represents manufacturer 𝑓’s counterfactual variable profit.  
For each individual product, variable profit is computed by multiplying the counterfactual product 
markup (𝑝𝑗
∗ −𝑚?̂?) and counterfactual product demand 𝑞𝑗
∗.  𝑉𝑃𝑓
∗̂  is the sum of variable profits 
across the menu of products of firm 𝑓 in a given market. We compare factual and counterfactual 
variable profits to evaluate changes in profitability at the product level as well as at the 
manufacturers’ level.  The above variable profit function implies that firm 𝑓’s variable profit 
depends both on its product markups and demand levels.  Therefore, we are able to decompose 
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changes in variable profits by changes in markups and demand levels, and examine how these 
components drive the changes in variable profits.  
In Table 2.7, we summarize changes in monthly market demand, markup and variable 
profit for traditional auto-drip brew coffee products as well as single-cup brew coffee products.  
Among traditional auto-drip brew coffee products in a market, we find predicted increases in 
consumer demand, with a mean predicted increase of 3.88%.  In contrast, consumer demand for 
single-cup coffee products in a market is predicted to decline by a mean 98.5%.63  Consistent with 
intuition, almost all auto-drip coffee products in the data are predicted to have a positive change 
in demand, whereas each single-cup coffee product is predicted to have a negative change in 
demand.  
In terms of predicted changes in product markups, we find that across markets, a subset of 
auto-drip brew coffee products would experience increases in markup, with increases as high as 
52%, while the remainder of auto-drip products would experience decreases in markup, with 
decreases as low as 5%.  The predicted mean change in markup for auto-drip products is positive 
and equal to 0.55%. Similarly, a subset of single-cup brew products are predicted to experience 
increases in markup, with increases as high as 51%, while the remainder of single-cup products 
are predicted to experience deceases in markup, with decreases as low as 67%. The predicted mean 
change in markup for single-cup products is negative, i.e., there is a mean decline (5.8%) in 
                                                 
63 We summarize the quantity change for all auto-drip brew ground coffee products and all single-cup brew coffee 
products in the whole data sample before and after the simulation. We find 99.2% auto-drip brew ground coffee 
products have an increase in demand with the min of 0.00009% and the max of 73%, only 0.8% has demand reduced 
in the counterfactual.  All single-cup brew coffee products experience reduction in demand in the simulation. At the 
market level, the model predicts a mean increase in auto-drip brew coffee demand in 599 out of total 600 markets.  
We believe the model predicts quite well the change in product demand for both coffee types, even though a few auto-
drip brew coffee products have negative counterfactual demand changes.  
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markups of single-cup products. On average, the predicted changes in markups are small in 
magnitude relative to the predicted changes in product demand levels. As such, the predicted 
change in variable profit for each coffee product is often predominantly driven by the change in 
the product’s demand rather than the change in its markup. 
Auto-drip brew coffee products in a market show a mean predicted increase in variable 
profit of 4.6%, with increases as high as 117%.  However, single-cup brew coffee products are 
predicted to experience reductions in variable profits, with a mean reduction of 98.6%.  The 
predicted changes in auto-drip brew coffee products’ demand levels and variable profits suggest 
significant cannibalizing effects associated with the introduction and growing presence of single-
cup brew technology coffee products. Put differently, suppose consumers no longer have a 
preference for the single-cup brew coffee consumption experience, a typical auto-drip brew coffee 
product could have had much greater demand and profitability in such a counterfactual world. The 
counterfactual removal of consumers’ preference for the single-cup brew technology also implies 
a substantial decline in profitability of a typical single-cup brew coffee product. 
 
 2.6.2 Predicted Changes in Prices and Markups  
Results in Table 2.7 reveal that counterfactual removal of consumer preference for the 
single-cup brewing technology may have a positive or negative impact on the markup of any coffee 
product.  Predicted changes in product markups underlie counterfactual impacts on equilibrium 
price levels based on the assumption that product-level marginal costs are unchanged. In what 
follows, we discuss how the introduction and growing presence of the single-cup brew coffee 
products affect market equilibrium price levels.    
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Before we examine the counterfactual change in equilibrium prices, it is useful to discuss 
the potential forces at play in the market equilibrium analysis.  Put differently, should we expect 
equilibrium prices of auto-drip brew coffee products to rise, decline or remain unchanged, and 
what should we expect about equilibrium price changes for single-cup brew coffee products?  
The counterfactual exercise causes shifts in product demands.  In particular, by imposing 
the preference change that the preferred single-cup brew consumption experience becomes equally 
satisfying to the auto-drip brew consumption experience, the model predicts a reduction in demand 
for single-cup brew coffee products, but a rise in demand for auto-drip brew coffee products.  The 
increase in demand for auto-drip brew coffee products will put an upward pressure on prices of 
these products owing to a direct demand effect.  Higher prices for auto-drip brew coffee products 
will in turn put upward pressure on prices of single-cup brew coffee products owing to strategic 
Nash equilibrium price-setting behavior of firms.  In other words, the increase in demand for auto-
drip coffee products puts upward pressure on prices of both types of coffee products.  In contrast, 
the decrease in demand for single-cup brew coffee products will put a downward pressure on prices 
of these products owing to a direct demand effect.  Lower prices for single-cup brew coffee 
products will in turn put downward pressure on prices of auto-drip brew coffee products owing to 
strategic Nash equilibrium price-setting behavior of firms.  In other words, the decrease in demand 
for single-cup brew coffee products puts downward pressure on prices of both types of coffee 
products.  In summary, everything else being unchanged, the simultaneous increase in demand for 
auto-drip brew coffee products but decrease in demand for single-cup brew coffee products can 





Table 2.7 Summary Statistics of Counterfactual Changes in Demand, Markup, and Variable Profit for Coffee Products in a 
Market 
 Auto-drip Brew Coffee Products 
 Single-cup Brew Coffee Products 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Demand 
Market Mean 
Initial Levels (fl oz) 
15410 5865.99 6936.63 36622.69  2219.29 1182.89 444.4 6536.91 
Market Mean 
Counterfactual Levels (fl oz) 
15977 6143.04 7116.89 39255.29  31.48 26.7813 0.0001 167.33 
Change (fl oz) 567.33 496.62 -659.23 3096.93  -2187.81 1168.83 -6419.36 -438.17 
% Change (%) 3.88 2.84 -3.33 31.22  -98.54 0.92 -99.99 -96.36 
Markup 
          
Market Mean 
Initial Levels (¢/fl oz) 
0. 73 0.07 0.61 1.70  0.76 0.15 0.61 2.82 
Market Mean 
Counterfactual Levels (¢/fl oz) 
0. 74 0.07 0. 61 1.46  0.71 0.07 0. 59 1.51 
Change (¢/fl oz) 0. 0039 0.04 -0.57 0.59  -0.05 0.13 -2.11 0.63 




          
Market Mean Initial Levels ($) 122.42 54.90 50.74 422.2  17.51 12.21 2.96 163.38 
Market Mean 
Counterfactual Levels ($) 
127.86 57.82 51.94 431.32  0.22 0.18 1.02e-06 1.13 
Change ($) 5.44 9.50 -110.55 129.65  -17.29 12.16 -163.38 -2.92 





In Table 2.8, we show the summary results of the counterfactual changes in prices of auto-
drip brew coffee products and single-cup brew coffee products.  The mean counterfactual change 
in prices of auto-drip brew coffee products is positive and the mean counterfactual change in prices 
of single-cup brew coffee products is negative, even though some products of either coffee type 
have both positive and negative counterfactual price changes. In particular, under the 
counterfactual scenario in which the preferred single-cup brew consumption experience becomes 
equally satisfying to the auto-drip brew consumption experience, our model predicts that, on 
average, prices of auto-drip brew coffee products will rise by 0.4%, even though prices of a subset 
of these products will fall, with declines as large as 17.6%, and prices of the remainder of these 
products will rise, with increases as large as 116%. Similarly, the counterfactual change in 
consumers’ preference for coffee brewing technology also predicts that, on average, prices of 
single-cup brew coffee products will fall by 0.02%, even though prices of some of these products 
will rise, with increases as large as 68%, and prices of some of these products will fall, with 
declines as large as 11%. In summary, since counterfactual removal of consumers’ preference for 
the single-cup brew consumption experience is predicted to increase auto-drip brew coffee product 
prices on average, then we can reasonably infer that the introduction of the consumer-preferred 
single-cup brewing technology resulted in auto-drip brew coffee product prices being lower, on 






Table 2.8 Summary Statistics of Counterfactual Change in Prices, by Coffee Type 
  
Auto-drip Brew Coffee 
Products 
 Single-cup Brew Coffee 
Products 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 




Market Mean  
Initial Levels (¢/fl oz) 
1.593 0.109 1.310 1.947  6.410 0.317 5.352 7.620 
Market Mean  
Counterfactual Levels (¢/fl 
oz) 
1.598 0.133 1.285 3.426  6.410 0.487 5.351 11.032 







% Change (%) 0.368 4.875 -17.6 116.31   -0.019 5.658 -10.6 67.7 
 
 2.6.3 Welfare Analysis 
The estimated random coefficients logit demand model permits us to analyze the change 
in welfare associated with imposing the counterfactual assumption that consumers are indifferent 
between coffee consumption that uses single-cup brewing technology and coffee consumption that 
uses traditional auto-drip brewing method.  Following Nevo (2001), McFadden (1984), Small and 
Rosen (1981), Petrin (2002), Train (2009), and many others, the consumer surplus for consumer 𝑖 






       (2.13) 
where 𝛼𝑖 is the random coefficient for price and 𝑉𝑖𝑗 = 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗.  The change in consumer 










     (2.14) 
where 𝑉𝑖𝑗
∗  is evaluated at the new counterfactual equilibrium price vector 𝑝∗ and when the 
coefficient estimates associated with the Single-cup Brew dummy variable are set to zero, while 
𝑉𝑖𝑗 is evaluated at actual price vector, 𝒑, and the coefficient estimates reported in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.9 presents summary statistics of the average consumer surplus obtained from 
consuming one fluid ounce of brewed coffee by a typical coffee drinker in a sample of 200 
individuals in each market from the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data.  As the price of 
a product is measured by dollar(s) per fluid ounce, an individual’s consumer surplus measure is 
interpreted as their net benefit in dollar amount from consuming one fluid ounce of brewed coffee.  
We convert the dollar(s) to cent(s) in the table.  In Table 2.9, a typical consumer in a market is 
predicted to have a mean decrease in welfare of 2%.  In other words, if consumers’ preference for 
the single-cup brew technology is counterfactually removed, then a typical coffee drinker’s net 
benefit from consuming one fluid ounce of brewed coffee is predicted to decrease by 2%. This 
result, in turn, suggests that the introduction of the consumer-preferred single-cup brewing 
technology resulted in an increase in consumer surplus.   
 
Table 2.9 Summary Statistics of Counterfactual Change in Individual Consumer Surplus 
in a Market 
    Mean Std. err. Min Max 
Consumer Surplus  
for a typical 
individual ( 𝑪𝑺𝒊̂ ) 
Initial Levels (¢/fl oz) 0.056 0.004 0.002 1.230 
Counterfactual Levels (¢/fl 
oz) 
0.055 0.004 0.002 1.223 
Change (¢/fl oz) -0.001 0.00005 -0.012 0.008 
% Change (%) -2.013 0.093 -9.619 28.078 
 
 
 2.7 Conclusion 
The introduction of the single-cup brewing technology in the late 2000s has not only 
changed the way many brew-at-home coffee drinkers brew and consume coffee in daily life, a 
change from brewing one “pot” at a time to making one cup at a time, but also altered the overall 
landscape of the US brew-at-home coffee market. This paper is motivated by the fact that sales of 
coffee products that require the single-cup brewing technology rose quickly, while sales of coffee 
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products that use the traditional auto-drip brewing method were substantially cannibalized with 
the introduction and growing presence of the single-cup brewing technology.  To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper constitutes the first formal study of the economic effects of the introduction 
and growing presence of the single-cup brewing technology on the US brew-at-home coffee 
market.  
The empirical analysis is conducted using IRI retail-level scanner data on sales of coffee 
products during year 2012. We find consumers, on average, prefer consuming brewed coffee 
products using the single-cup brewing method instead of the traditional auto-drip brewing method.  
In particular, a typical coffee drinker is willing to pay up to ¢2.52 extra per equivalent fluid ounce 
to consume brewed coffee using the single-cup brewing technology instead of using the traditional 
auto-drip brewing method. This relative gap in consumers’ willingness to pay for the two distinct 
coffee brewing method technologies increases with consumer income, that is, higher income 
consumers obtain an even greater satisfaction from coffee consumption with the single-cup 
brewing technology.  
To investigate the market effects associated with the presence of single-cup brewing 
technology on the US brew-at-coffee market, we use the estimated model to perform a 
counterfactual experiment. The counterfactual experiment involves removing consumers’ relative 
preference for using the single-cup brewing technology instead of the traditional auto-drip brewing 
method, and simulating new equilibrium market outcomes based on consumers’ counterfactual 
preferences. The counterfactual preference change yields a mean increase in consumer demand for 
traditional auto-drip brew coffee products of 3.88%, and a substantial mean decrease in demand 
for single-cup brew coffee products of 98.5%. Second, auto-drip brew coffee products are 
predicted to have a mean increase in variable profit of 4.6%, with increases as high as 117%, 
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suggesting, at least in some markets, there exist substantial cannibalizing effects associated with 
the introduction and growing presence of single-cup brewing technology coffee products on 
traditional auto-drip brew coffee products. Third, the counterfactual experiment also predicts a 
mean increase in prices of auto-drip brew coffee products and a mean decrease in prices of single-
cup brew coffee products, suggesting that the introduction of the consumer-preferred single-cup 
brewing technology resulted in auto-drip coffee product prices being lower, on average, than 
would otherwise be the case.  
Last, the consumer welfare analysis suggests that consumers enjoy net benefits from the 
presence of single-cup coffee brew technology.  The introduction and growing presence of single-
cup brewing technology is predicted to increase a typical coffee drinker’s welfare by 2%.  
It is worth pointing out some limitations of our analysis. We simplify modeling the supply 
side of the market by assuming retailers play a passive role in the price-setting game.  Other vertical 
relationships between coffee manufacturers and retailers can be examined as a potential extension 
of this current work [see Villas-Boas (2007b) and Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2010)].  It may be 
interesting to investigate whether or not various vertical contracts between manufacturers and 
retailers influence predicted changes in market outcomes given the counterfactual change in 
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Appendix A - Proof of Lemma 1 for Chapter 1 
Assume positive price and quantity for each firm, we first compute the Nash equilibrium 






















)     
The sufficient and necessary conditions for the strictly positive price and quantity requires 
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The set (2) conditions have a contradiction, as 𝐻 > 0, 𝛽 > 0, marginal costs 𝑐𝑖 are non-
negative. If 2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 < 0, this contradicts with (2𝛽 + 𝛽)𝐻 − (𝛽 + 𝛽)[2𝛽 − (𝑛 −
1)𝛽]𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 < 0. Therefore, we conclude that to have positive Nash price and quantity 
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